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ABSTRACT 
 
EXPLORING RELATIONSHIP AMONG RESIDENT DISSATISFACTION,  
 
COMPLAINTS AND REWARD IN THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT:  
 
LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
By 
 
Kyung Bok Lee 
 
 
This study examines the effects of distributive, procedural, interactional justice on 
resident’s satisfactions for the development of locally unwanted land use (LULU) that does 
not meet expectation. Government provides public facilities in the form of urban 
development project in order to support regional residents’ life. For the development of 
locally unwanted land use (LULU) as urban development project managed by government to 
support regional residents’ quality of life, degree of satisfaction may differ based on how it is 
preceded in terms of implementing the project in the residential area. For this development 
plan, residents were allowed to receive government’s reward or were given a partial subsidy 
on new locally unwanted land use development. 
This study explored residents’ satisfaction by applying justice dimension on locally 
unwanted land use (LULU) development. In particular, this study proposed the research 
question as follows; i) How negative perception in distributive justice affects resident’s 
dissatisfaction; ii) How negative perception in procedural justice affects resident’s 
dissatisfaction; iii) How negative perception in interactional justice affects resident’s 
dissatisfaction; iv) How resident’s dissatisfaction effect to complaints intention; v) How 
(What) the high intensity of complaining behavior effect to resident’s decision against locally 
unwanted land use (LULU) development; vi) What will government reward to resident’s 
mind toward to locally unwanted land use (LULU) development; and vii) What will 
government reward that lead to satisfactory and public confidence level to the residents on 
the locally unwanted land use (LULU) development; Moreover, this study examines resident 
dissatisfaction on government unwanted public development plan by applying different 
rewards. 
To measure the findings, this paper conducted surveys, and applied statistical 
analysis using chi-square, factor, and regression. The result indicated that government 
rewards negatively affected resident attitudes toward the locally unwanted public 
development. This study provides the both theoretical and public policy implementation on 
the urban development plan.  
 
Keywords: Urban Development, Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU), Justice, Satisfaction, 
Dissatisfaction, Reward. 
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I. Introduction 
Urban development planning plays a crucial role in settling a possibly small town to 
one of the major cities in the area. There is a political and technical aspect on maximizing on 
utilization of land and the structure of the urban environment. There are various plans to be 
made in order to enforce the growth of a city or an area. The concept of sustainable urban 
development is a complex activity that requires a set of complementary approaches and 
appropriate strategies incorporating aspects such as: attractiveness of cities, support for 
innovation, job creation, and development disparities within cities, governance and funding 
of urban regeneration (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013). While promoting a positive 
outcome from the process of the planning, there are some plans that might not be the ideal for 
the residents in the area such as applying the locally unwanted land use in developing areas.  
The practical definition of sustainable development leads to new socioeconomic and 
environmental requirements imposed to urban ecosystems on which cities adapt through a 
process of adjustment and remodeling aimed to improve living conditions in a city, named 
urban regeneration, in which housing policies play a critical role (Petrisor A. I. 2010). The 
purpose of locally unwanted land use (LULU) plan is waste management. Urban 
development policy is essential to the appropriate planning by both national government and 
regional government regarding needs and wants, but developments often make little progress 
due to opposition from the residents who live in government development area. In case of 
derelict land include waste water treatment facility, garbage incineration plant, crematorium 
facility, highways, low-rent housing, and hazardous facilities. The projects create political 
tension, for as a society we want them, but as individuals - and often as communities – we do 
not want them close to us. They are locally unwanted land uses, or LULUs (Popper 1985). 
While are different types of waste that will come to locally unwanted land use for 
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decomposition, part of urban development planning is to practice and exercise on how to 
minimize any disposals to eventually improve economics efficiency, impact on health of 
residents through recycling and proper management. Hence, it is inevitable to build a locally 
unwanted facility in order to proceed with urban development plan for a greater outcome in 
the area. Opposition arguments, after the initial angry phase, usually express three specific 
concerns: the perceived threat to property values, personal security, and neighborhood 
amenity (Dear 1992). Also there may be disadvantage in residing area where locally 
unwanted land use (LULU) is being located, such as diminishing property value in the area. 
Government subsidy or compensation can recover the residents’ property values, as with 
reward for depreciation on homes near locally unwanted land use. Sometime resident want to 
have unwanted land use development in their community. For instance, location of locally 
unwanted land use development often decided through competitive bidding schemes for 
sufficient government reward (Inhaber 1992), where locally unwanted land use impact can be 
accepted and relevant to adequate compensation levels (Popper 1992).   
By Considering the Cost of the implement strategy to decrease its event has been a 
significant key to many quality improvement programs. General perception of public can be 
easily understood that a quality of life is more important than well-structured materials’ well-
being. Considering the environment in the urban development, it is worthwhile to study on 
residents’ dissatisfaction in case under this type of circumstances. It is necessary to 
investigate on residents expectations in government’s program in the locally unwanted land 
use in the development area, and predict residents’ responsive behavior based on the act from 
the government. This study posits that each individual’s responses to a various conflicted 
situations are perceived justice. Perceived justice has very wide boundary of its meaning, 
particularly three dimension of justice: distributive justice, interactional justice, and 
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procedural Justice (Alexander and Ruderman 1987; Bies and Shapiro 1987; Clemmer and 
Schneider 1996). 
Blodgett et al., (1993) mentioned that interactional justice concentrates on the way of 
behaving how the complainant was treated whereas the perceived fairness of the policies and 
procedures implanted by government. This development was proceed either with mutual 
understanding and respect between government and residents, and was able to take care of 
the residents’ decision making or, alternatively, residents were asked more government’s 
supports on this public facility development. Subjects were asked to read seven hypothetical 
scenarios of locally unwanted land use development being moved forward in your town, and 
asked residents how they feel about this particular type of public development and what type 
of government support they seek that would satisfy them. 
The purpose of this study is to further examine the linkage between perceived justice 
and post complaint behavior of residents in the area as consumers. More specially, this study 
will access the effects of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on residents’ 
negative perspectives and supporting of negative intentions. This will also investigate the 
residents’ perception on the several factors of locally unwanted land use development which 
affect to the resident’s dissatisfaction, and measure their dissatisfaction on the justice created 
by the government. This study is interesting in that we explored the effect of justice; this way, 
we can verify the relevant to importance of justice that could change residents’ perception by 
the government evaluating their dissatisfaction. 
By considering the impact of each dimension of justice on post complaint behavior 
of residents in the development area, government can concentrates more on the negative 
viewpoint of complaint management. This research will help the government to develop more 
effective and cost efficient methods for resolving resident’ dissatisfaction, which will turn out 
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with higher levels of efficiency. In other words, this research is to examine what aspects of 
resident is important to residents when they are making a decision on locally unwanted land 
use development, how much the resident is dissatisfied with government policy or 
development plan, how the resident’s perception is influenced by the dissatisfaction, and how 
much the government’s monetary/non-monetary rewards are differed by the residents 
dissatisfaction and judgment. 
In the development area of locally unwanted land use (LULU), the government’s role 
is to understand the current status of the residents and how the government’s policy (i.e. 
monetary rewards, subsidies) can influence residents’ dissatisfaction into something positive. 
This study will set the residents’ dissatisfaction as a center of the investigation, and how the 
three justices can influence their perception. Furthermore, this study also examines whether 
the residents’ dissatisfaction contribute to the improvement of the government rewards as 
post-factor. 
 
The following research questions will be investigated: 
1. How negative perception in distributive justice affects resident’s dissatisfaction? 
2. How negative perception in procedural justice affects resident’s dissatisfaction? 
3. How negative perception in interactional justice affects resident’s dissatisfaction? 
4. What the effects of residents’ dissatisfaction effect to complaints intention? 
5. How (What) the high intensity of willingness complaints effect to resident’s decision against 
locally unwanted land use (LULU) development? 
6. How (What) the high intensity of actual complaints effect to resident’s decision against 
locally unwanted land use (LULU) development? 
7. What will the government monetary reward do to resident’s mind toward to government 
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locally unwanted land use (LULU) development? 
8. What will the government non-monetary reward do to resident’s mind toward to government 
locally unwanted land use (LULU) development? 
9. What affects a reward that lead to satisfactory & confidence level to the residents on the 
locally unwanted land use (LULU) development? 
 
Procedures from government development plan are assessed by residents’ perception 
and their own interests; hence, the residents’ behavior is decided according to their own 
experiences based on their expectation level of government rewards. The resident 
dissatisfaction and satisfaction are subject to assessment on the government rewards, and it 
may influence the government’s monetary/non-monetary rewards. This study will figure out 
the correlation between the resident dissatisfaction and government development policy and 
reward, and how it was proved by many previous researches in various fields.  
 
II. Literature Review 
Numerous studies have attempted to find and explore the correlation between 
dissatisfaction and reward as well as dissatisfaction and justice including the effectiveness of 
non-monetary reward. This paper studied various theories and models that support residents’ 
dissatisfaction related studies reviewed in chapter III which could applied on residents’ 
dissatisfaction related studies. It reviewed many of diverse satisfaction, justice and reward 
related academic journals and text books, particularly for measuring resident’ dissatisfaction 
level. Urban development and redevelopment projects are continuously driving and these 
projects will continue on for years. Locally unwanted land use must be part of this 
development project to give the area a function and provide convenient community. 
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Furthermore, analyzing the importance of applying distributive, procedural, and interactional 
justice in these development projects are essential in order to conclude what can give the 
most dissatisfaction on residents in the area, and how it will lead the government into 
effectively proceed with the projects. Another crucial factor that comes into play would be the 
type of reward that can either promote or discourage residents’ satisfaction, and how they 
change their behavior afterwards. 
2.1 Urban Development Plan 
Urban planning (urban, merged urban regions, regional, city, and town planning) is a 
technical and political process concerned with the use of land and design of the urban 
environment (Taylor 2007). Urban development including a major infrastructure such as 
airport, harbor, road and water networks. Urban planning and urban development provide a 
development of necessity for communities. Furthermore, government must consider diverse 
technical strategies including urban design, landscape architecture and policy implication and 
recommendation to fulfill community needs.   
The concept of sustainable urban development is a complex activity that requires a 
set of complementary approaches and appropriate strategies incorporating aspects such as: 
attractiveness of cities, support for innovation, job creation, development disparities within 
cities, governance and funding of urban regeneration (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013). 
Purely coming from the concept point of view, the idea of sustainable urban development is 
an attractive proposes for a long term benefit in potential growth in living standard and 
possible profit from incoming tourists. Example for Romania mentioned above is a perfect 
case of launching such development for everyone to enjoy as defined the territory of Romania 
as “part of the national wealth enjoyed by all citizens, including the management of 
development processes by activities of landscaping, urban planning or sustainable urban 
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development of central and local public authorities” (Tenea D., Stan M.I., Vintilă D. 2013). 
 “Successful and sustainable development of urban areas requires strong local and regional 
partnerships” (Critchley P. 2004). For this to occur, continuous communication between 
residents and local and regional governments is needed so that implementation of integrating 
the new developments into existing infrastructure that can transform the area for people’s 
anticipated future. Cities offer both source and the solution to challenges in sustainability in 
urbanized world (Grimm et al. 2008; Rees & Wakermagel 1996; Tan, Wang & Sia 2013).  
Urban development policy and implications have started restructuring due to urban 
environment in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Bramley & Power 2009; Dickinson 2005; 
Krueger & Buckingham 2012). Government realized the importance of inner city re-
development than continuous urban expansion in suburbs area.   
Urban development strategies based on higher urban density are frequently demand to 
support environmental sustainability. Moreover, these development strategies focused on the 
cost-efficiency of infrastructure networks such as waste collection & recycling facilities, 
water & sewer network system and electrical distribution system. Government and urban 
planners considered to give multi-function in various infrastructure systems for communities 
and cost-efficiency. Accordingly, waste process heat from industry and power plants can be 
used for space-heating in dense urban developments; and use of motor vehicles can be 
reduced by facilitating walking, cycling, and public transportation in denser urban areas 
(Holden & Norland 2005; Kenworthy 2006; Van der Waals 2000). This can be more efficient 
in cities with higher density because of the potential of growth in sustainability by 
implementing creative options that can be less environmentally damaging, and it is possible 
because of the structure of urbanized areas leave a lot to be desired in terms of the application 
of the planning for sustainability. 
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However, the potential of the compact city policy to contribute to environmental 
sustainability is actually very limited when the environmental impact of consumption is 
considered (Holden & Norland 2005; Neuman 2005; Van der Waals 2000). There are other 
factors including less economically hence costly, intensive research and planning which the 
time given to complete is uncertain, and sustainability strategy may shift to more corporate 
focus and its commitment to the plan. High density urban development has the opportunity to 
positively impact urban sustainability. New urban development policy promotes to decrease 
car dependency, to increase the potential for spontaneous interaction and to create the sense 
of community in neighborhoods (Burton 2000; Nasar & Julian 1995; Talen 1999). This 
greatly increases the quality of life that the individual or groups in the developed areas 
receive basic needs and create a good quality of life. In a broader sense, success in 
environmental sustainability will lead to an open and accountable structure in governance 
toward communities. 
Sustainability is the most important factor for conceptual framework of urban 
development, and urban planning. Therefore, urban development policy and plan can be 
useful methods create or maintain sustainable urban environment (Grimm et al. 2008; Holden 
& Norland 2005; Musakwa & Van Niekerk 2013). It always provides the steady economic 
growth that will meet the needs in present without negatively affecting the future generations. 
2.1.1 Locally Unwanted Land Use Development 
Despite of the necessity and usefulness to society that LULU offers to the area, it is 
common that residents and neighbors object to the facility being installed in their “backyard.” 
However, government can overcome these obstacles from resident by providing counterparts 
to balance the developed area with something more people-friendly and eye-pleasing features. 
Irwon-dong Maru Park in Korea and Niagara Park in Canada display great examples on 
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benefiting both local residents’ enjoyment of public facilities while government can take 
advantage of the land to implement LULU in the area.   
Location Application Original Function 
   
Irwon-dong Maru Park, Korea Sports Park Wastewater Treatment Facility 
   
Seoul Memorial Park, Korea Parks, Gallery, Cafeterias Crematorium Facility 
   
Pangyo Clean Tower, Korea 
Natural Park, Library, 
Observatory 
Garbage Incineration Plant 
   
Osaka Disposal Plant, Japan Experience Space, Park Garbage Incineration Plant 
   
Niagara Park, Canada Natural Park Hydroelectric Power Plant 
Table II-1. Case of Locally Unwanted Land Use Development with Government Non-monetary Rewards  
Supplementary development for community (Refer to Online Resources). 
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Locally unwanted land use indicates the usage of land that could be useful to society, 
but there can be objections coming from the residents in the area it is being built in. While 
providing a community needs, such as power plants, dumps, prisons, roads, etc., the 
unwanted development projects occur amid tension to residents who live in that development 
area. Residents know well enough about what that particular development project. Residents 
even know how much that unwanted development project is important facility for their 
community. But as individuals, they do not want that kind of facilities near their houses. We 
call those facilities or development plans the locally unwanted land uses, or LULUs (Popper 
1985). Frank Popper (1981) mentioned “Locally Unwanted Land Use” (LULU) to describe 
unwanted development projects that create residents opposition, such as crematorium facility, 
unsanitary waste incineration facility or waste water treatment facility. Initially, the 
“unwanted” term bring the assumption that opposition of the residents in public facility 
development area from the risk of public health threat and to the environment. Lately, the 
locally unwanted land use reference has expanded to highways, large scale mall, prison and 
facilities for low-income residents (Dear 1992; Susskind 1990). Informing and involving the 
public is usual for LULU such as public hearing, informational meetings to bring residents’ 
participation to communicate with the government. If they are able to identify and resolve 
any concerns at early stage, there can be a mutual outcome for residents and the government. 
In core of every locally unwanted land use development contain huge negative 
externalities. Locally unwanted land development projects may include transportation 
infrastructures, waste treatment facilities or power production facilities. All facilities 
mentioned above produce noisy, danger, nasty smell and pollution. It may offend its residents 
because of such intrinsic features as its technologies or occupants. Or it may offend its 
consequences – increased traffic, industrial byproducts, or the problems its mismanagement 
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could create (Popper 1985). Following their negative externalities, LULU usually decreases 
residential property values surrounding them. In some cases, values may go down upon the 
news of LULU’s entering in the area; lengthy construction period will leave the area 
undesirable to reside. However, none of the studies on real estate transactions in the vicinity 
of human service facilities has demonstrated a property value decline that could clearly be 
linked to the facility (Dear and Taylor 1982). Although the relationship between house prices 
to the planning of LULU can be complex, there are various options to compensate the 
residents where LULU is either in construction or operation. 
The central problem the legislation addressed was the familiar resistance of almost 
any community to the presence of a hazardous waste facility nearby, a resistance 
characterized as the NIMBY (for Not In My Back Yard) or LULU (Locally Unwanted Land 
Use) problem and known to obstruct development of many facilities, both public and private 
(O’Hare and Sanderson 1993). Environmentalists come into play when it comes to this 
problem because of the safety issues among residents from having LULU nearby, and accuse 
government (or developer) of anything that can be environmentally damaging to the area. 
Environmentalists are concerned with output of locally unwanted land use. Especially, 
environmentalists are defending the residents who opposed to the LULUs against the larger 
group of consumers who benefit from their output (Popper 1985). However, locally unwanted 
land use development have been failed, changed or delayed for years because of 
environmentalists. If government built too small, too late, or in insufficient numbers; made 
too difficult, disputable, or expensive to manage these LULUs that eventually create anti-
environmentalist sentiment among political moderates and conservatives (Popper 1985). 
Instead of environmentalists failed attempts to oppose proposed or operating LULUs in blind 
sights, they need negotiate to find the middle ground that can satisfy residents and 
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environmentalist and national/regional goals. Locally unwanted land use developments have 
become critical social problems. Waste water treatment facility, waste incineration facility 
and crematorium facility are evident of LULU developments. Residents generally accepted 
such developments by their needs. But LULU developments encounter strong opposition 
when it actually comes to the local community. LULU can considered the same as NYMBY 
(not in my back yard) syndrome. Some people are simply averse to living near facilities 
perceived as threatening (Amour 1991). 
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This paper reviewed many of diverse urban development related academic journals 
and text books that particularly for Locally Unwanted Land Use. Table II-2 shows a summary 
of diverse researches regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use. Previous studies on the topic of 
Locally Unwanted Land Use have explored various issues such as the effect of Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development as table II-2 shows. 
 
Year Author Title Major Issue of Study 
1981 Popper Siting LULUs. Planning 
Risk to human health and to the 
environment 
1985 Pitney Jr. 
Bile Barrel Politics: Siting 
Unwanted Facilities 
LULU siting planning can cause 
pain and anger to local residents.  
He named “Bile Barrel” to LULU 
policies 
1987 Morell 
Siting and the Politics of Equity, 
in Lake, 
Distrust of government,  Cause 
Imbalance of Cost-benefit,  
Depreciation of property value, 
Deprecation of local image, Cause 
inconvenience to residents, Cause 
traffic congestion 
1990 Susskind & Ozawa 
Mediated Negotiation in the 
Public Sector: The Planner as 
Mediator. 
Provide an example of how LULU 
siting can be managed as a 
negotiation 
1990 Stamato 
Planning and politics: a winning 
strategy 
High level of intervention approach 
to local residents and officials 
1992 Dear 
Understanding and Overcoming 
the NIMBY Syndrome 
Depreciation of property value, 
Distrust of government  
1992 Inhaber 
Of LULUs, NIMBYs, and 
NIMTOOs 
Sufficient rewards and 
compensation can be resolution for 
LULU siting issue  
1993 Weisberg 
One city's approach to NIMBY: 
how New York City developed a 
fair share siting process 
An equitable LULU distribution 
process mat obviate the need for 
financial incentives or compensation  
1993 O’Hare & Sanderson 
Facility Siting and Compensation: 
Lessons From the Massachusetts 
Experience. 
Resident’s negative reaction comes 
from depreciation of their property 
value and unwanted sharing 
1994 Petters & Eduljee 
Environmental impact 
Assessment for Waste Treatment 
and Disposal Facilities 
Cause Imbalance of Cost-benefit  
Table II-2. Summary of Previous Study on Locally Unwanted Land Use Development (Extended from Choi & Lee 2010) 
 
This paper reviewed many of diverse urban development related academic journals 
and text books that particularly for Locally Unwanted Land Use. Table II-2 shows a summary 
of diverse researches regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use. Previous studies on the topic of 
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Locally Unwanted Land Use have explored various issues such as the effect of Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development as table II-2 shows. 
 
This illustrates that, instead of whether to proceed with LULU development or not, 
issues mentioned below are more complex in terms of overseeing different perspectives to 
satisfy both parties: local residents and the government. Conflict begins when both parties 
attempt to find solutions to convince resident to allow LULU development with condensation 
while overcoming the potential long term issues that can affect the area that LULU is being 
implemented on. This is why it is important to analyze from various studies to come to terms 
with how government can give the highest level of satisfaction to the resident and lead them 
to be more faithful to the government by providing what is essential necessity for them. 
 
2.2 Justice 
Overall perception of Justice 
The fact that the dimensions of justice are independent is generally accepted. 
Distributive, procedural and interactional justices define overall perceptions of justice on 
complaints. Greenberg and McCarty (1990) pointed out those giving instructive, informative 
notes when evaluating a performance with poor review without explanation is more 
acceptable. According to Lind and Tyler (1988), studied in social psychology has proven that 
if interested parties do not receive any outcome what residents expected. This study has 
proven that estimation of procedural fairness affected by the suitability with resident decision 
making procedures are explained and by the manner in which the focal party is treated during 
the conflict resolution process (Bies and Moag 1986; Tyler and Bies 1989). 
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2.2.1 Distributive Justice 
Distributive Justice has played a pivotal role in theory of justice in term of equity. Blau 
(1964) and Adams (1965) defined that the distributive justice has its origin in social exchange 
theory, which enhances the function of equity in following exchanges. The equity principle 
defines a fair exchange as one in which each party to an exchange receives an outcome in 
proportion to one’s contribution to the exchange (Messick and Cook 1983). Therefore, 
according to Messick and Cook (1983), the general purpose of distributive justice is not only 
distributing thing to people, but also helping people to do fair exchanges so that can 
contribute to one’s proportion of exchanges in equity. Deutsch (1985) suggested that the 
function of distributive justice is not only the role of equity in exchange and sharing, but 
there are others applied to this rule: need and equality. This indicates that distributive justice 
is design for people to share or exchange to each other in an equal manner for their own 
benefits. Moreover, Distributive justice issues are pervasive throughout society, existing in all 
situations where individuals or groups enter into exchanges (Deutsch 1985). 
Theoretically, distributive justice is very closely related to people’s dissatisfaction 
since it aims to the people’s equity and equality in sharing and exchanges. Thus, if 
distributive justice is not working properly on fair distribution, it would effects on people’s 
dissatisfaction. Even when systematically distributive justice results in even distribution to 
the residents for compensation, a problem might arise when, in this case, residents’ 
expectations are not met with the government compensation provided. There is considerable 
evidence indicating that equity evaluation influence customer satisfaction, perceived services 
quality, and repurchase intensions (Fisk and Coney 1982; Mowen and Grov 1983; Oliver and 
DeSarbo 1988; Oliver and Swan 1989; Huppertz, Arenson, and Evans 1978). 
In other words, distributive justice can influence to people’s dissatisfaction by how it 
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evaluated based on the process of the distributive justice being implemented. It has three 
important elements to determine the value that reflects equity, equality, and need in the 
process of residents’ interaction with the government and perceive the intention as to how 
distributive justice implemented can be beneficial to the residents (see table II-3). The 
researches done in the past support the importance of influential effect of distributive justice 
in residents’ aspect of LULU implementation by the government. 
 
Distributive Justice Definition Dependent Variable(s) Representative Research 
Equity 
Provision of outcomes 
proportional 
to inputs to an exchange 
Satisfaction, repurchase 
intention, word of mouth 
Goodwin and Ross (1992) 
Oliver and Desarbo (1988) 
Oliver and Swan (1989) 
Equality 
Equal outcomes 
regardless of 
contributions to an 
exchange 
Satisfaction, social 
harmony 
Greenberg (1990a) 
Deutsch (1985) 
Need 
Outcome based on 
requirements 
regardless of 
contributions 
Satisfaction Deutsch (1985) 
Table II-3. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998) 
 
2.2.2 Procedural Justice 
In defining warnings, it may be useful to begin with the suggestion that dictionary 
defines “procedural justice is the idea of fairness in the processes that resolve dispute and 
allocate resources”. According to Thibaut and Walker, Procedural justice refers to the 
perceived fairness of the policies, procedures, and criteria used by decision makers in arriving 
at the outcome of a dispute or negotiation (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988; 
Alexander and Ruderman 1987).  
Procedural justice considers the equity and the fairness of the procedure are 
significant factors when residents make a decision on LULUs. And procedural justice can 
compare with distributive justice. Seen from fairness factor’s point of view, Leventhal, 
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Karuza, and Fry (1980) mentioned. “Fair procedures are consistent, unbiased and impartial, 
representative of all parties’ interests, and are based on accurate information and on ethical 
standards.”  (Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980).  Fair procedures also allow focal parties to 
provide input into the decision (Greenberg and Folger 1983; Goodwin and Ross 1922). 
Government’s successful decision and implementation of the plan will depend on the fair 
procedure of job performance.  
Sometimes, the governmental work have shown procedural justice in specific part of 
their role where fairness and justice are needed. Moreover, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) 
proved that legislative setting has provided the crucial factors of procedural justice (Barrett-
Howard and Tyler 1986; Folger and Konovsky 1989; Tyler 1987). Procedural justice seems to 
be a simple concept, main point that appears especially related to resident’s complaints is 
feedback speed with which the discord is resolved (Hart et al. 1990; Kelley et al. 1993; 
Clemmer and Schneider 1996). 
Based on this statement, procedural justice can reflect people’s dissatisfaction 
through their complaints.  This dissatisfaction can give influence to focal group decision 
making, which may confront and interfere with the government’s project for the 
implementation of locally unwanted land use development. A number of studies have cited 
the negative emotional states and resulting dissatisfaction caused by the perceived unfairness 
of waiting too long in service situations (Katz, Larson, and Larson 1991; Venkatesan and 
Anderson 1985). When government has failed to achieve a development project through 
procedural justice, its result could give a bad influence to resident’s dissatisfaction within 
development area; hence, the overall outlook of the process can be considered as a “failure” 
in residents’ perspective. 
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Procedural Justice Definition Dependent Variable(s) Representative Research 
Process Control 
Freedom to 
communicate views on 
a decision process 
Satisfaction, commitment 
Goodwin and Ross (1992) 
Kanferetal. (1987) 
Lind and Tyler (1988) 
Decision Control 
Extent to which a person 
is free to accept or reject 
a decision outcome 
Satisfaction, relationship 
investment 
Brett (1986) 
Heide and John (1992) 
Accessibility 
Ease of engaging a 
process 
Satisfaction 
Bitner, Booms, and 
Tetreault (1990) Bowen and 
Lawler (1995) 
Time/Speed 
Perceived amount of 
time taken to complete a 
procedure 
Anger, uncertainty, 
satisfaction, service 
quality 
Fisk and Coney (1982) 
Maister (1985)  
Taylor (1994) 
Flexibility 
Adaptability of 
procedures to reflect 
individual 
circumstances 
Market orientation, 
satisfaction 
Bitner, Booms, and 
Tetreault (1990) 
Narverand Slater (1990) 
Table II-4. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998) 
 
2.2.3 Interactional Justice 
Interactional Justice refers to the manner in which people are treated during the conflict 
resolution process; for example, with courtesy and respect or rudely (Bies and Moag 1986; 
Bies and Shapiro 1987). Bies and Moag claim that how much important of person’s attitude 
in conflict resolution process. People can easily dissatisfy with government official’s attitudes 
depends on how the government approach to cooperate with people’s dissatisfaction.  
A previous study (Bies and Moag 1986) has dealt with various case studies such as 
job performance assessment, service encounter which verified some factors relevant with 
interactional justice for instance honesty. Clemmer (1993) conducted study with following 
factors courteous, kindness, meticulous, attractiveness, truthfulness and compassion, 
confidence by Parasuraman et al. (1985) and endeavor (Mohr 1991), concern and explicitness 
(Ulrich 1984). The most important factor of resident complaint is acceptance of blame 
(Goodwin and Ross, 1989) and proposing of an apology (Goodwin and Ross 1992; Bies and 
Shapiro 1987; Folkes 1984). 
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Government may need to offer an apology to people (residents) when they have 
treated people with lack of courtesy and respect. An apology can be a kind of reward or 
compensation to residents. Because Jacoby and Jaccard (1981) mentioned that 
communication is used in relation to the resolution of resident’s complaints as a key factor. 
Interactional justice affects to resident’s understanding on LULUSs. When the services do not 
provide sufficient communications, conflicts are created from residents’ complaining that can 
grow quite rapidly. These ties to procedural justice where everything need to be transparent in 
order to properly communicate with residents, and notify them on a regular basis.  
Limited empirical research has investigated the concept of international justice in a 
marketing context (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1991). Overall, interactional justice has proven 
that fair interpersonal treatment contributes to satisfaction with service encounters (Bitner et 
al. 1990; Tyler 1987), improved assessment of complaint handling (Goodwin and Ross 1989, 
1992), improve the service quality assessment (Parasuraman et al. 1985), and attractive to 
repurchase intentions (Blodgett and Tax 1993). Government can also concentrate their efforts 
on complaints by residents who are dissatisfied with government’s actions and attitude as it 
can be an easy fix as government need a right tone and action used to convince resident if 
they want to proceed with something in their way. 
Interactional Justice Definition Dependent Variables Representative Research 
Explanation/Causal 
Account 
Provision of reason for a 
failure 
Attributions for 
failure, 
satisfaction, fairness 
Bies and Shapiro (1987) 
Bitner. Booms, and Tetreault 
(1990) 
Honesty 
Perceived veracity of 
information provided 
Satisfaction 
(complaint handling) 
Goodwin and Ross (1989) 
Politeness 
Well-mannered, 
courteous behavior 
Complaint evaluation, 
repurchase intention, 
satisfaction 
Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) 
Clemmer (1988) 
Goodwin and Ross (1989) 
Effort 
Amount of positive 
energy put into 
resolving a problem 
Anger, satisfaction, 
trust 
Folkes (1984). 
Mohr and Bitner (1995) 
Empathy 
Provision of caring, 
individual attention 
Service quality, 
satisfaction 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and 
Berry (1988) 
Table II-5. Definition of Justice Elements and Associated Research (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998) 
20 
 
2.3 Satisfaction 
2.3.1 Consumer Satisfaction 
Consumer satisfaction is central to the marketing concept (Anderson, Fornall, and 
Lehmann 1992). With evidence of strategic links between satisfaction and overall firm 
performance (Anderson, Fornall, and Lehmann 1992), it is easy to understand mission 
statement in concept of satisfaction, reward programs that target satisfaction as a goal and 
resident communications that announce reward for satisfaction accomplishment (Fournier 
and Mick 1999).  
Government can find people’s satisfaction through consumer satisfaction model. The 
outcome will reflect people’s satisfaction as well as government performance. Moreover, 
government can predict the level of people’s satisfaction on future development plan and 
minimize any potential conflicts.  
A study on satisfaction has been proportional to increasing its importance. Overarching 
comparison standards (CS) paradigm has applied in many studies in the past years. CS 
paradigm has used widely on evaluation of performance for customer perceptions on products, 
compare performance and standard of products, and then form summary satisfaction 
judgments (Oliver 1989). These factors can be taken into an account by overseeing the 
process of the government’s planning on satisfying residents’ needs in exchange of its 
development plan.   
It is very important on how the government manages residents in development area. 
People would compare government policies with previous or similar plans. Result will be 
influenced by people’s trustworthiness towards the government based on the past experience 
and current status of government’s priority.  
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2.3.2 Consumer Dissatisfaction 
The popular view of confirmation/disconfirmation of presumption satisfaction standards 
is the essential determinant of satisfaction (Erevelles and Leavitt 1992; Oliver 1996). This 
comparison standards (CS) Paradigm proposed that confirmed standards lead to moderate 
satisfaction, exceeded standards lead to high satisfaction, and underachieved standards lead to 
dissatisfaction (Fournier and Mick 1999). In past studies, there are many features that were 
included to measure the positively balanced aspects of subjects’ involvement to satisfy 
customers. 
A few CS paradigm researchers have gone beyond these cognitively toned model 
formulations to consider the affective nature of satisfaction (Oliver 1996; Westbrook1987). 
Oliver (1989) suggested five different types of satisfaction: i) contentment with major effect 
of acceptance, ii) pleasurable which is a positive reinforcement state that involves the 
evocation of a positive, iii) well-liked experience and a primary effect of happiness, iv) relief 
which is a negative reinforcement state occurring when an aversive state is removed, v) 
novelty with expectations of the unexpected that yield a primary effect of either delight or 
outrage as occurs when the product performs outside the range of expectations. The result of 
practical examination was more stingy structure than Oliver’s original proposed (Oliver 
1996). CS paradigm, however, contains a lack of level of residents’ satisfaction in an 
emotional aspects and further study hopefully would act as a corrective role and take that into 
consideration. 
Miller (1976) discusses “a model of the consumer satisfaction process” which suggests 
sorting out different types of expectations brought to the purchase/consumption situation and 
which conceives of satisfaction latitudes. Satisfaction is created from the interaction level 
expectation of future status of the project and evaluation of the finished project. Instead of 
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asking the consumer simply what he or she “expects” of a product or service in order to 
measure or predict satisfaction, the researcher should explicitly measure (at least be aware of) 
“types” of expectations the consumer might use as comparison standards for performance 
evaluations: The ideal, the expected, the minimum tolerable, and the deserved may reflect 
separate distinct levels of performance expectations for a given consumer (Hempel and 
Rosenberg 1976). Based on Miller’s theory, the degree of satisfaction of residents can differ 
depends on what type of compensation it is willing to provide although CS paradigm can still 
affect the relation accordingly to Oliver’s suggestion mentioned above. 
In a simplified manner, the satisfaction process may be described as a servo-mechanistic 
system, somewhat like that suggested by Howard and Sheth (1969). The individual brings to 
the purchase/consumption situation a set of expectations, which are a function of his past 
history as well as of the current situation. The set of expectations is not fixed but is modified 
by active information search and by selective biases in perception and retention (by the 
residents of the government in this case). There is evidence, in fact that expectations 
themselves influence the perception of the outcome (Engel, Kollat, and Blackwell 1973; 
Olshavsky and Miller 1972). Expectations are determined through various factors done 
through processes such as information selection, rationalization, characteristics of individual, 
and etc.  
Due to this reason, we can conclude the reactional behavior resulted from expectations 
and evaluation performance shift both ways. This is why there are differences in the system 
of expectancies among residents based on the factors mentioned above. When an the 
residents’ evaluation of performance and their set of expectations have interacted, residents 
are likely to feel “satisfied” if they perceives that the outcome is equal to or superior to the 
expectation, and dissatisfied if it perceives that the outcome is less than expected. 
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2.3.3 Complaining Behavior 
Dissatisfaction is on the opposite side of satisfaction which relevant to discomfort 
feelings or actions, such as resident’s complaining behaviors (Oliver 1997). Based on the 
definition of locally unwanted land use (LULU), and how people’s perception of NIMBY 
towards LULU can cause dilemma when LULU comes as a project of urban development in 
the area. The dilemma can be create by the influence of environmentalists on residents of 
where locally LULU is nearby, and teach them to bluntly say no by just looking LULU’s 
negative externalities. 
In attempt to remedy dissatisfaction, the most studied consequence of CS is 
complaint behavior. The intensity of complaint behavior was often hypothesized to be 
directly proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction (Bearden and Teel 1983). When 
development is being criticized, depends on the degree of dissatisfaction, the outrage of 
residents can act out in protests to support against it to the point where no growth is desired in 
the area. 
However, Significant evidence posits that complaining behavior is not only 
expression of the intension of resident’s dissatisfaction but of some elements such as 
resident’s perception of the attribution of dissatisfaction, resident’s expectation on 
government rewards, cost efficiency of unwanted land use development project (Day 1984 
and Singh and Howell 1985).  This study can explain a large number of dissatisfied 
residents do not complain (Day 1984) although there are different type of complainers, and 
that determines the type of behaviour they choose to react to complain. 
Previous research explored the relationship from dissatisfaction to complaining 
behavior and it suggests applying defensive marketing to handle complaints by dissatisfied 
residents (Chu, Gerstner, and Hess 1998) and to handle the relationship between residents and 
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government by examining constraints (Ping 1993). However the defensive marketing is 
structured, understanding the motivation of people’s complaining behavior can accomplish to 
attain the “happy medium” of the unique circumstances of urban development and/or 
application of LULU in the area. 
Many previous studies examine the correlation between resident’s dissatisfaction and 
complaining behavior but not many studies examine this relationship in LULU development 
area. Residents need to categorize into two groups; i) residents who have intensity of 
willingness to complain, ii) residents who have intensity of actual complaints. This study 
examines how the dissatisfaction from LULU development affects to the intensity of 
resident’s complaints. 
2.4 Reward 
It is more and more obvious that reward can relieve the dissatisfaction on locally 
unwanted land use development project. Main viewpoint on value sensitivity which explains 
the difference in feeling of how important of something (Hsee 1996, 1998; Hsee et al. 1999, 
2009). A reward reflects the resident’s dissatisfaction and it often moderate the resident’s 
dissatisfaction. Residents can involve with number of crucial values which symbolize the 
level of resident’s internal feelings (Diester and Nieder 2007; Rubinsten et al. 2002). 
Resident’s conflicts occur when individual-resident sharing the limited resource with other 
neighbors, therefore government need to regenerating sustainable resource to resolve 
resident’s conflicts (platt 1973).    
Research so far either collects only an overall measure of both forms of intrinsic 
motivation or looks at situations that may not be readily generalizable to business contexts 
within ﬁrms, such as, blood donations or the voluntary contribution to public goods (Costa-i-
Font et al. 2011; Reeson and Tisdell 2008). Besides potentially leading to unintended framing 
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effects due to an artiﬁcial framing of studies when testing only monetary rewards (Liebig et 
al. 2006; Melles 2001), this focus of extant work interferes with our ability to judge the pros 
and cons of monetary and non-monetary, afﬁliative rewards with respect to the crowding-out 
phenomenon. 
Since it has become the most widely used frame for studying the crowding-out 
phenomenon in psychological literature that ‘yielded more than 400 empirical publications 
since the early 1980s’ (Gagne´ et al. 2010), it seems particularly suited to the present research 
question as it allows linking our work to prior ﬁndings, thus providing for a way to achieve 
cumulative growth in our knowledge on the interplay of rewards and motivation in 
inﬂuencing effort. 
2.4.1 Monetary Reward 
Some studies point to the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by monetary rewards also 
in a business context (Fessler 2003; Weibel et al. 2010), whereas others fail to ﬁnd such a link 
(Cadsby et al. 2007; Van Herpen et al. 2005). Much of the research in management and 
organizational control on rewards is inspired by economics – and especially principal-agent 
theory – and considers monetary rewards an effective and efﬁcient means for fostering work 
effort (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Baker 2002). 
The provision of rewards is a central element of organizational control systems 
(Anthony and Govindarajan 2006; Flamholtz et al. 1985; Malmi and Brown 2008; Merchant 
and Van der Stede 2012; Otely 1999) and management accountants are more involved than 
ever in the design of reward systems (Wolf 2011). This is where the government feels it as an 
option to compensate the residents in exchange of locally unwanted land use development. 
This option might have been kept as one as most researchers have focused on monetary 
rewards, and especially on performance-contingent monetary rewards such as bonuses (Baker 
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2002; Bouwens and van Lent 2006; Holmstro m¨ 1979). Non-monetary, afﬁliative rewards – 
signals of appreciation and recognition by peers or superiors linked to a strengthening of 
social ties – receive little attention, even though these rewards are prevalent in business (Foss 
2007; Frey 2007; Frey and Neckermann 2006). 
On the counterpart, researchers disagree over the usefulness of monetary rewards for 
fostering work effort. Many scholars in our ﬁeld – inspired by economics – consider 
monetary rewards both effective and efﬁcient (Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bouwens and van 
Lent 2006; Kunz and Pfaff 2002). An increasing number of scholars claim, based on ﬁndings 
in psychology and education research, that monetary rewards simply substitute internal 
motivation with external motivation without necessarily increasing employees’ overall 
willingness to work (Frey and Jegen 2001; Osterloh and Frey 2000; Weibel et al. 2010). 
According to this statement, the government might use this method to numb the potential 
dissatisfaction from residents; however, this also argues that it might not be a feasible 
solution in the long run. 
2.4.2 Non-Monetary Reward 
Deci (1971) also suggested that non-monetary, afﬁliative rewards should not shift the 
locus of causality, and hence, result in the net effect on effort corresponding to the gross 
effect. If this were to hold true, then non-monetary afﬁliative rewards would be a highly 
attractive means for fostering employees’ willingness to exert work effort. The ﬁndings thus 
support Deci’s (1971) suggestion that not all types of rewards exhibit the same relations with 
motivation and work effort. Hence, both research and practice stand to gain from taking the 
‘low-cost’ non-monetary, afﬁliative rewards more into account when studying and designing 
organizational control systems. Based on Deci’s theory, the government can subsidize to 
contribute to the community rather than individuals in the area as a cost-effective solution. 
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Previous study has shown that directly consumable, primary reinforcers show steeper 
temporal dis-counting than conditioned reinforces such as money (Odum and Rainaud 2003). 
Rachlin, Raineri & Cross (1991) posits that monetary reward decrease possibility of 
resident’s dissatisfaction towards LULU development. There are a certain conditions 
monetary reward shall moderate resident’s internal motivation in cognitive social psychology. 
Previous research Lepper and Green (1978), Deci (1975), Deci and Ryan (1985) defined “the 
hidden cost of reward” for this cost. 
 
2.4.3 Reward as a Mediator 
Hardin (1968) posit that over-consumption of limited resources occur critical threat to 
people who passing over this truths. To support Hardin’s point of view, Birjulin et al. (1993) 
stated that the dilemma arise when individual residents claim high compensations in limited 
sources. Birjulin, Smith, Bell (1993) mentioned that individual residents earn immediate 
benefit but, when all residents decide to claim higher government compensation, the action 
results in long term depletion of the resource because government can able to support 
residents with only a limited resources. In this statement, we can assume residents, as farmers 
in above theory, who feel more deserving of receiving excessive reward from the government 
out of their self-centeredness. Platt (1973) used a behavioristic approach to explain these 
situations, in which short term positive benefits for the individual are pitted against long term 
negative consequences for the group. Previous studies treated this issue under limited 
environment, because there were not many influence variables, for example confirmation and 
perceived level and competition.  
There are three potential motives which influence to harvesting behavior in common 
–dilemma behavior: firstly, residents have intention to maximize the reward or to successfully 
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compete with others. Secondly, to claim the reward in responsible manner that will bring 
public benefits. Lastly, to conform to implicit group norms regarding appropriate harvesting 
behavior (Messick et al. 1983). 
A number of commons dilemma studies have demonstrated the influence of 
competition on harvesting behavior (Baird 1982; Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee 1977; Luce & 
Raiffa 1957; Rosenbaum 1980). Rosebaum (1980) stated that residents tend to response when 
others are perceived as competitive and Dawes et al. (1977) mentioned that when residents 
beside other neighbors to act competitively. This would apply to residents’ compromising 
with the government in terms of allowing them to proceed with their plan on locally 
unwanted land use development. Based on the number of residents in the area, comparing the 
level of compensation would be highly likely as well as seeking a solution for oneself to 
receive more perks if possible. Empirical evidence of such an effect – commonly termed a 
‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic rewards (Frey 1997) – in work settings is 
still scarce (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Kunz and Pfaff 2002) and conﬂicting (Cadsby et al. 
2007; Weibel et al. 2010).  
This literature distinguishes human motivation according to its perceived source, the 
‘locus of causality’, along a spectrum ranging from internal to an individual to external to that 
individual, such as joy, personal norms or to external pressure (Adler and Chen 2011; 
deCharms 1968; Frey 1997; Heider 1958; Kreps 1997). In addition, following the ground-
breaking study by Deci (1971), work from this line of thought considers monetary rewards to 
inﬂuence the perceived locus of causality. Deci (1971) suggested that monetary rewards – if 
applied to a task that provides for task-related (‘intrinsic’) motivation – reduce this 
motivation’s impact on work effort. This implies the method, and the type the government 
provides to the residents as rewards, the effect of residents’ attitude can change which could 
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result in different perspectives of the government. That attitude may contain a 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction based on what and how government provided rewards. 
Bickel & Marsh (2001) examine that drug abusers discount their drug of abuse more 
steeply than they discount money. Moreover, Odum & Rainaud (2003) stated that result of 
their study reflect the drug abusers and property of rewards. According to Odum & Rainaud’s 
theory, if the government intends to use reward as a mediator, it should not be delayed in any 
sense otherwise the drawback on the level of residents’ satisfaction will be significant. 
 
III. Theoretical Background 
3.1 Customer Satisfaction Theory 
3.1.1 Contrast Theory 
The contrast theory is that when the product performance does not meet the customer’s 
expectation, the difference between the expectation and the outcome affects customer to 
exaggerate the disparity. (Engel and Blackwell 1982; Howard and Sheth 1969; Cardozo 
1965) Yi (1989) explained that “individuals may shift their evaluations away from 
expectations if their expectations are inconsistent with reality.” 
According to the contrast theory, if the disparity is occurred by customers’ perception 
between the expectation and the real product performance, the customers tend to evaluate the 
product away from the expectation. In other words, the disparity from high expectation with 
the poor product performance causes the understatement on the product, whereas the 
disparity from low expectation with the good product performance causes the overstatement 
on the product. The perception of product performance are enforced by the positive 
disconfirmation, and lowered by negative disconfirmation (Yi 1989). 
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3.1.2 Assimilation-Contrast Theory 
Sherif and Hovland (1961) defined that there are level of acceptance and refusal in one’s 
perception in the assimilation-contrast theory. Consumer only accepts when the difference 
between their expectation and performance is in their understanding degree, consumers have 
intention to assimilate the product rating face to their expectations (Yi 1990). Consumer’s 
high expectation leads more favorite ratings on product quality, whereas low expectations 
lead to less favorable ratings. Nonetheless, consumers refuse when the difference between 
their expectation and performance is very large then a contrast effect occurs and one’s 
perceived difference (Anderson 1973). 
Oliver (1977) mentioned that expectation and disconfirmation are separately relevant to 
the post-exposure rating in Assimilation Theory. The possibility that these findings may be 
moderated by another variable as predicted by assimilation-contrast theory could not be 
addressed because the latitude of acceptance of the subjects was unknown. Ideally, an intra-
subject analysis across a number of confirmation and disconfirmation experiences would be 
preferred. An individual’s latitude of acceptance across experiences may be presumed 
invariant (as opposed to the latitude of acceptance across subjects), the boundaries of the 
acceptance region could be used to moderate the analysis. Assimilation would be presumed to 
hold within this boundary and contrast effects without. 
In particular, research supporting the assimilation effect suggested that communication 
sharing something in common with members of an audience (e.g., views, values, lifestyles) 
were frequently judged to be similar or “just like me” (Oliver 1996). This perceived 
similarity facilitated communicator effectiveness, as the audience would assimilate the 
communicator’s viewpoints into its own (Hart and Diehl 1994). Thus, the assimilation 
framework, like dissonance theory, Clary and Tesser (1983) emphasize hesitate on one’s 
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acknowledge difference in hold position. It depends on one’s capability to explain obvious 
difference. Satisfaction researchers were, not unexpectedly, taken with this interpretation as it 
complemented assimilation theory nicely and provided for an unambiguous test of which of 
the two theoretical interpretations would dominate satisfaction decisions (Oliver 1996). 
The assimilation versus contrast controversy was fueled by a number of early studies, 
which appeared to support either an assimilation interpretation (Olshavsky and Miller 1972; 
Anderson 1973; Olson and Dover 1979). A study of Anderson (1973) is particularly 
instructive in this regard, as it tested assimilation against contrast and even provided a 
rationale for the operation of both in different situations. Specifically, Anderson argued that 
assimilation would hold when performance was similar to expectations, or close enough so 
that the consumer could view it as similar. Customers magnify the discrepancies between his 
expectation and actual product when customer receive product less worthy than customer 
expected. 
3.1.2 Dissonance Theory 
 As originally described by Festinger, dissonance is a psychologically uncomfortable 
tension state (Festinger 1976). The dissonance theory states the dissonance theory states that 
dissonant can become psychological tension to residents. Dissonance and restore consistency 
will decreased by this psychological uncomfortable tension. Festinger (1957) mentioned that 
change customer’s behavior and attitudes or contorted perceptions.  
Writers have described it as “a negative toned affective state with drive-like 
properties” (Gerard and White 1983), and still others have viewed it as undifferentiated 
arousal “that is labeled and experienced as a negative (locally unwanted land use 
development) state if the individual attributes the arousal to his or her attitude-discrepant 
behavior” (Elkin and Leippe 1986). A number of authors use the general term anxiety, which 
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would seem to encompass both negative affect and arousal. Festinger (1957) mentioned that 
disconfirmed expectancy occur a dissonance and uncomfortable feelings regarding the 
cognitive dissonance theory. Person who receives dissonant ideas which decrease his/her 
psychological discomfort by changing or distorting (Yi 1990). Perhaps the more general 
phrase inconsistency-induced psychological discomfort is most suitable for the present 
context because the task taken is that dissonance start with tiny concern and expands over the 
purchase intention of customer (Oliver 1996). 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance might lead one to predict the opposite 
effect. Dissonance theory would imply to customer who expect a high quality product and 
received a low quality product would perceive the difference and experience cognitive 
dissonance (Dissonance is aroused in this case because receiving a low-value product is not 
consistent with having expected a high-value product. Dissonance affect to its decrease which 
could be achieved by modifying the perceived differences (Cardozo 1965). 
Dissonance may be reduced by decreasing the perceived disparity between 
expectation and reward, but it cannot be reduced by magnifying the disparity. Thus, under 
conditions of high effort, dissonance reduction processes would tend to decrease the 
differences in product evaluation between customers who were disappointed and those who 
were not. The expenditure of effort itself may produce a perceived disparity between effort 
expended and product received, whether customers obtained what they expected or less than 
they expected. Caldozo (1965) studied when customers make little effort to get a product, 
he/she can get low quality product than what they expected. Subjects in the low effort, high 
expectation condition had no reason to reduce the disparity between the expensive products 
they saw in the catalog and the inexpensive products they received. In fact, they were free to 
magnify the disparity. Evaluations of the product were lower in the low effort, high 
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expectation condition than in the high effort, high expectation condition because contrast 
processes were free to operate in the former condition, but were partially blocked in the latter. 
In addition, Cardozo (1965) finds that one possible method to reconcile the difference 
between expectation and product would be to raise the evaluation of the product received 
(Cardozo 1965). 
The dissonance theory and the assimilation theory have common impact on 
anticipations (Yi 1990). Customer perceptions on products attributes can be influenced by 
their expectations and it can explain with the dissonance theory (Olson and Dover 1979). 
Nonetheless, many scholars failed to prove the dissonance effect (Cohen and Goldberg 1979).  
Yi (1990) stated that it is very difficult to prove that how disconfirmation creates dissonance. 
Festinger (1957) posits four scenarios which can cause dissonance. i) wiliness, ii) potential to 
disconfirmation, iii) unchangeable commitment towards the product, iv) incident of 
disconfirmation. Marginal expectations affect by product user comments and customer 
commitments. It is not quite clear that these factors meet in typical experiments. However, 
some previous studies are not quite clear due to given subjects. Yi (1990) pointed that clear 
evidence of disconfirmation is the necessary condition for the dissonance effect. 
3.2 Equity Theory 
 Previous research in CS has been influenced by equity theory (e.g., Fisk and Young 
1985; Mowen and Grove 1983; Swan and Mercer 1982; and Swan and Oliver 1985). 
Individuals compare the level of compensation with their neighbors who are in community in 
the equity theory (Adams 1963). Yi (1990) mentioned that individual comparison is based on 
level of equity, which consumer find what they received and others have received. 
 Previous study in equity theory examine customer dissatisfactions through 
disconfirmation of equity expectations (Fisk and Young 1985). Inequity and disconfirmation 
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affect to one’s satisfaction (Swan and Oliver 1985). Swan and Mercer (1982) found that the 
equity theory may be complementary to the effects of disconfirmation. If customer dissatisfy 
with their experience of either negative or positive inequity. They would express their 
dissatisfaction at the high level of negative inequity. Inequity cannot satisfy individual’s 
satisfaction, differ from equity theory prediction. Individuals may consider positive inequity 
as fair occasion or satisfaction. Therefore, CS paradigm can explained by equity theory. 
Nonetheless, it may need supplementary modifications.   
According to equity theory (Adams 1963; Hatﬁeld, Walster, and Berscheid 1978; 
Homans 1961), individuals are sensitive not only to absolute amounts of reward but also to 
the ratio of input to output, in which under-beneﬁt is deﬁned as a proportionally lesser ratio 
of output to input, whereas over-beneﬁt is a proportionally greater ratio of output to input. 
3.3 Justice Theory 
3.3.1 Perceived Justice 
 Perceived justice refers to the degree whether an individual feels fair or not in an 
exchange relationship. Such perceived justice is a component of justice theory by Adams 
(1963) and is evaluated by the two principles, balance and correctness (Sheppard et al., 1992). 
Balance indicates a process which an individual compares his/her input and output to the 
other’s under the same situation, and thus one would feel imbalanced in terms of the justice 
when his/her input exceeds the output, compared to the other individuals’ under the same 
situation. Furthermore, correctness is a concept on whether an outcome/ output is right or 
wrong, and, to some extends, includes moral judgment relate to the accurate outcome/ output. 
For example, when a laundry damages clothes through his carelessness and blames for the 
clothing quality not himself, the owner/ customer considers such damage is due to his 
carelessness and sees his blame as incorrect and unfair. Balance and correctness do not 
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always coincide; but both are crucial factors decisive to the level of individual perception on 
the justice. Hence, a consumer views a situation as fair or not, based on principle, either 
balance or correctness (Maxham III, 1998).  
Oliver (1996) categorizes three types on the individuals based on the perceived justice; 
with a case of service failure, 1) the one who prefers to receive less; 2) the one who prefers 
fairness; and 3) the one who prefers to have more. He also states that the one who prefers to 
have more in service failure are more sensitive to the justice.  
 
3.3.2 Distributive Justice 
 Distributive justice explains the level of justice through outcome/output which one 
would receive (Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990; Gilliand, 1993). Consumers 
compare a product or service of a company to the similar or identical one of another company, 
thus distributive justice refers to the justice which a consumer perceives on the outcome of 
service recovery. The foundation of distributive justice theory is social exchange theory, 
which focuses fairness on the outcome/input ratios in the result of exchanges (Adams, 1963). 
This explains justice in exchanges and encompasses various distributive rules, including 
contribution, equality and needs rules; however, Goodwin and Ross (1992) argued most 
consumers prefer greater rewards than less regardless of such rules. Hence, any consumer 
who perceives unfair on the service failure will demand reward and compensation. He would 
judge whether such reward and compensation are fair or not, comparing his input/outcome 
ratio to the relevant comparison. He will be satisfied only if he is rewarded enough. For 
instance of tangible rewards, when a salesperson in a shopping mall causes inconvenience to 
a customer, s/he gives a discount coupon as the effort for service recovery; or when a 
consumer exchanges a product due to its poor quality, the salesman rewards the consumer 
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with small amount of money for transportation. In case of which a consumer perceives the 
reward is fair compared to his/her loss and inconvenience, you can refer this to distributive 
justice. The more tangible rewards given by a service provider for service failure, the higher 
level of satisfaction on service failure recovery as the level of distributive justice perceived 
by a customer increases. Other studies show that customers expects various forms of 
monetary rewards for the inconvenience caused due to service failure, however the degree 
and details of rewards vary according the circumstances (Bitner, 1990; Gilly and Geld, 1982).  
 
3.3.3 Procedural Justice 
 Procedural justice is defined as a standard applicable in a process of solving a problem 
(Goodwin and Ross, 1992), justice of a method to obtain an outcome (Greenberg, 1990),  
and fairness perceived in a process to correct service failure (Mattila and Mount, 2003). To 
sum up, procedural justice denotes a process to yield an outcome, or more precisely an 
assessment over policies and procedures used to produce an outcome (Thibaut and Walker, 
1975; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Greenberg and McCarty, 1990). Thibaut and Walker (1975) state 
that people do consider an outcome important but also have a great interest in procedural 
justice for the outcome. Lind and Tyler (1988) explained procedural justice with an example 
of traffic offenders in the court of Chicago; when their cases were dismissed without trial, the 
traffic offenders were often angry and dissatisfied though the outcome was favorable to them 
(no fine, no records or else). Distributive procedure cannot explain this, however procedural 
justice does that the court caused dissatisfaction of the offenders since it did not meet the 
standard of appropriate trial process. Tyler(1994) points out factors that can influence on the 
perceived justice in a process of service recovery are neutrality in decision making process, 
trust on a service provider, respect for customers, and information provided to customers in 
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service failure and recovery. Johnston (1995) said that customers/consumers desire to know 
what caused service failure during the process of service recovery. What makes procedural 
justice important in a process of service failure recovery is that customers would not perceive 
the process as fair if they were mistreated or hurt their pride, and thus they would not be 
satisfied. 
  
3.3.4 Interactional Justice 
 Interactional justice is fairness perceived on the attitudes towards  customers and 
interaction experienced in the service recovery process, namely the degree customers feel that 
they were fairly treated by an employee (Mattila and Mount 2003; Bies and Moag, 1986; Bies 
and Shapiro, 1987;and Blodgett et al., 1997). Existing studies say that interactional justice 
stresses on inter-relational procedures while procedural justice does on structural procedures 
in general. (Greenberg and McCarty 1990). That is, interactional justice is fairness relate to 
humanistic side of the other party (employee, seller, etc.), which can explain why customers 
see a certain case as unfair despite a positive outcome and procedural justice at present during 
the service failure recovery. (Bies and Shapiro 1987). For example, though a customer 
received a full refund (distributive justice) due to service failure and the refund process was 
prompt (procedural justice), if the employee served the customer with a long face and 
haughty attitude, the customer would be satisfied with the outcome, but not with the 
employee’s attitude (interactional justice).  
 Various studies deal with interactional justice; Bies and Moag (1986) regards the justice 
as the degree of courtesy, attention, honesty and rudeness, and Clemmer (1993) as honesty, 
kindness and sensitivity; and Parasuraman et al. (1985) states that sympathy and confidence 
have a major impact on satisfaction. Goodwin and Ross(1992) defines interactional justice as 
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apologies, which is a crucial means to countervail rude or inappropriate behavior. Therefore, 
it is critical in failure recovery to sincerely apologize for the failure, even if a service provider 
cannot offer a typical reward. What’s more, numerous studies conclude that interactional 
justice displays a positive relationship to satisfaction (Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault, 1990; 
and Blodgett et al., 1997).  
 
3.4 Monetary Reward Incentive Model 
Measurement of performance intends to influence on decision making and 
organizational behavior and motivate individuals and an organization to enhance their 
performance. And, rewards are a representative means to utilize to improve their performance 
(Milgram and Roberts, 1992). In other words, the higher expectancy between performance 
standards and one’s own effort; the higher instrumentality between achievement result and 
incentive; and the higher value the incentive is to an employee, the higher effects of the 
monetary incentive, such as bonus. “Understanding the cognitive processes affected by 
monetary incentives and setting up compensation plans that target these processes can reduce 
these costs. Such plans likely will have the most positive effects on effort and performance 
(Cho, 2013).”  
Nonetheless, rewards do not continue to guarantee higher performance. Kohn (1993) 
argue that rewards only lead temporary compliance, not continual changes in attitudes and 
behavior. Especially reward system can be a trigger factor which distorts measurement of 
performance. Monetary reward work well as a means of motivation when the expectation 
grows out of fair assessment on performance (Leonard, Beauvais and Scholl, 1999), it can 
however induce distorted strategic responsiveness from earning management (Weitzman, 
1980). 
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3.5 Complaint Handling Framework 
In private sector, many firms need to restruct their organization to adjust to customer’ 
satisfaction (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998). And firms shall implement strategies 
that they learned from their service failures in order to reorganize the services reliability by 
customer monitoring (Hart, Heskett and Sasser 1990). Residents’ complaints data can use as a 
foundation of complaint management. This data base can be used to correct the problems 
from residents by government LULU development (Lovelock 1994). Relevantly, the concept 
correlates to residents’ complaining behavior from dissatisfaction of being aware what the 
government is planning: Locally Unwanted Land Use development.   
Resident’s complaints caused directly from the government LULU development 
because they are only feedback that provide the organization with an opportunity to recover 
effectively from the residents’ dissatisfaction. This study examines the relationships in shaded 
area in figure III-3. Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran (1998) mentioned that factors that link 
satisfaction with complaint handling include both the direct effects and two-way interactions 
between the three justice concepts. Satisfaction with complaint handling is positioned as the 
mediator between the perceived justice evaluations and the relationship variables (Tax, 
Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998). Previous experience with the government’s LULU 
development plan is proposed to moderate the influence of satisfaction with complaint 
handling on both trust and commitment. 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
Figure III-1. A Framework for Examining Complaint Handling Relationships, (Tax, Brown and Chandrashekaran 1998)  
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IV. Hypothesis Development 
Oliver (1997) explained the level of difference of probability of occurrence by how 
predictive expectation such as disconfirmation of expectation or expectancy disconfirmation 
affects on consumer satisfaction. This study address that resident’ perceptions of justice vary 
in the community, where government development is needed for locally unwanted land use 
development, based on the situational behavior from the government and how residents 
respond. As shown in the proposed model (Figure IV-1), this study was set up to determine 
how justice experienced during the government’s attempted implementation of locally 
unwanted land use in the development area, and how dissatisfaction gets affected based on 
what government offer as compensation. Contrast theory explains the correlation between as 
well as resident’s expectation and actual outcome, and it explains resident’s dissatisfaction 
(Engel and Blackwell 1982; Howard and Sheth 1969; Cardozo 1965). 
This study covers how residents perceived government reward, and how government 
delivered LULU development in local community affects the justice factors such as identified 
equality effort and response timing. Moreover, this study examines the relationship among 
residents dissatisfaction, cause of resident complaints resident’s complaining behavior, how it 
affects the behavior on the government, and how it ultimately affects the area for the 
implementation. 
 
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
Figure IV-1. Proposed Model of Justice, Dissatisfaction, Complaining Behavior & Government Reward for Locally 
Unwanted Land Use Development (Modified from Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997 and Oliver 1980) 
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4.1 A Basic Framework of This Study 
4.1.1 Effects of Distributive Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction 
Perceived justice can divided into three, and one of them being distributive justice 
(Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997). Blodgett, Hill, and Tax (1997) consider that perception of 
distributive justice depends on one’s complaining which mirror of his/her feelings. There are 
two important factors in distributive justice which are need and equality. When individuals 
received the same outcome regarding distribution of equality demands (Blogett, Hill, and Tax 
1997). Moreover, distributive justice has correlation with exchange theory; numbers of 
marketing researches are focused on proper distributive rules as equity and need (Blogett, 
Hill, and Tax 1997).  
There should be fairness in distribution, satisfying both rules that distributive justice 
applies, in terms of administration processing of the policy and reward compensation when it 
comes to government’s service to residents for locally unwanted land use development. When 
there is inadequacy in distributive justice of government’s policy and planning in locally 
unwanted land use development area, there is likely an increase in residents’ dissatisfaction 
and complaints. Furthermore, because it is possible for residents to oppose to the 
government’s policy, distributive justice plays an essential role to each individual in the 
development area. Based on the consideration this study hypothesized the effects of 
distributive justice on dissatisfaction.  
 
H1: Negative perception in distributive justice from government’s implementation of LULU 
affects increased level of dissatisfaction.  
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4.1.2 Effects of Procedural Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction 
Based on the definition of procedural justice, in a study of service encounter incidents, 
Clemmer (1993) also identified flexibility, waiting time/responsiveness, and efficiency as 
dimensions of procedural justice. This definition matches a study by Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 
(1997) which considers perceived justice, classified into three, and procedural justice (e.g., 
process control, decision control, accessibility, timing/speed, and flexibility). These particular 
criteria reflect many concepts that also have been associated with residents’ satisfaction and 
service quality (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985; Bitner et al. 1990, Hui and Bateson, 
1991; Blogett, Hill, and Tax 1997). These factors are considered in terms of what can trigger 
residents’ complaints and dissatisfaction on government’s process of implementing policy in 
the development area. 
Time loss is seen as both aggravating and expensive to the residents (Maister 1985). 
Waiting appears to be especially disconcerting when the customer is angry and uncertain to 
begin with, and believes that there is delay in government’s implementation (Taylor 1994). It 
has potential to be a case of residents’ complaint situation (Blogett, Hill, and Tax 1997). 
Hence, types of deficiency in the government’s procedural action can result in different level 
of dissatisfaction. 
There should be accuracy in procedural activities in government’s policy in terms of 
administration processing of the policy and reward compensation as government’s service to 
residents for locally unwanted land use development. When there is inadequacy in procedural 
justice of government’s policy and planning in locally unwanted land use development area, 
there is likely an increase in residents’ dissatisfaction and complaints. Furthermore, because it 
is possible for residents to oppose to the government’s policy, procedural justice plays an 
essential role to each individual in the development area. 
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H2: Negative perception in procedural justice from government’s implementation of LULU 
affects increased level of dissatisfaction.  
 
4.1.3 Effects of Interactional Justice on Resident Dissatisfaction 
Interaction or contingency theory assumes that no one-set of tools or processes is best in 
all circumstances. Out of three perceived justice, Interactional justice explains customer 
response regarding their complaining behaviors, and honest, politeness, empathy and effort 
are key components for this essential framework (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997).    
The theory asserts that there is no one best way to design organizational 
communication systems because what is best for an organization, or a subunit within it, is a 
highly complex function of many variables. In addition, the theory emphasize the effect of 
one set of variables may be contingent upon the larger context in which they operate. The 
studies include Farace, Monge, and Russell (1977), DeSantics and Gallup (1987), Hiltz 
(1988), Hiltz and Johnson (1989), etc. According to Blogett, Hill, and Tax (1997), previous 
studies have identified a number of other elements associated with interactional justice, such 
as truthfulness, the provision of an explanation (Bies and Moag 1986), politeness, 
friendliness, sensitivity, interest, honesty (Clemmer 1993), empathy and assurance 
(Parasuraman et all. 1985), directness and concern  (Ulrich 1984), and effort (Mohr 1991). 
These features play a key role in giving the government appropriate attitude towards the 
residents with hope of gaining their respect back in return. 
With these features in check with the government, there should be active interactions 
between the government and residents in terms of administration processing of the policy and 
reward compensation when it comes to government’s service to residents for locally 
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unwanted land use development. When there is lack of courtesy and respect in interactional 
justice of government’s policy and planning in locally unwanted land use development area, 
there is likely an increase in residents’ dissatisfaction and complaints. Furthermore, because it 
is possible for residents to oppose to the government’s policy, distributive justice plays an 
essential role to each individual in the development area. 
This hypothesis provides to signpost for the government service by addressing how 
much interactional communication is important to both residents and government 
representatives (Blodgett, Hill, and Tax 1997; Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault, 1990; Solomon, 
Surprenant, Czepiel, and Gutman 1985). 
 
H3: Negative perception in interactional justice from government’s implementation of LULU 
affects increased level of dissatisfaction.  
 
4.2 Effects of Dissatisfaction on Complaining Behavior 
4.2.1 Effects of Residents’ Intentions in Dissatisfaction towards the Government 
Cho (2001) mentioned that satisfaction is the reverse side of dissatisfaction due to 
solution for feelings that related to discomfort such as residents’ complaints (Oliver 1997). In 
previous study examines the correlation among satisfaction, dissatisfaction, trusty and 
ignorance in relationship (Ping 1993). 
Previous research explains resident’s complaining behavior as the procedure through 
dissatisfaction effects (residents or government representatives) or no response depends on 
the intention of complaining (Bearden and Teel 1983; Day and Landon 1977). Hirschman 
(1970) and Cho (2013) determines responses of dissatisfied residents as existence (opposing 
any government policies implemented), voice (protest against government for government’s 
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faults and claim resident’s expectation), also remain devotion (maintain trust toward to 
government). 
If the government fails to provide adequate service/interaction according to the any 
one of the justices, an increase in residents’ dissatisfaction will occur, and the increase 
dissatisfaction will affect complaints’ intention. Depends on the degree and numbers of 
complaints towards the government, we can see the residents’ perception on the government. 
When it comes to this circumstance, where complaints accumulated by the residents, the 
government needs to notice residents’ growing negative perception and resolve the issue by 
measuring the level of their complaints.   
 
H4: Resident dissatisfaction from government’s implementation of LULU will have negative 
effect on complaints’ intentions.  
 
4.3 Effects of Complaining Behavior on Government Rewards 
4.3.1 Effects of Residents’ Willingness to Complain on Government Development Policy 
On government’s inadequacy in auctioning on the policy, it creates complaints among 
residents which results in increasing dissatisfaction and complaint’s intention. In this case, 
government needs to consider a method to resolve the level of complaints and dissatisfaction. 
Rewards come in convenience on government’s perspective, and providing such incentive 
will contribute to decrease in residents’ complaints and dissatisfaction. Based on the level of 
residents’ complaints, more opportunity for them to receive rewards will be likely. 
 
H5a: The high intensity of willingness complaints from government’s implementation of 
LULU will affect increased chance of getting rewards. 
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4.3.2 Effects of Complaints Resulting in getting Rewards from Government. 
It will be important for future studies to further investigate in this matter using different 
situational types of complaints filed against government’s LULU implementation. This 
displays strong preference of receiving a reward as compensation. Ultimately, based on this 
study, it is relevant to government’s development policy government needs mutual 
understanding with residents by constant communication to find the “middle ground,” to keep 
them away from dissatisfied. 
Although this study proposes this outcome, the type that lead to satisfaction can be 
situational, and be dependent upon the initial subject to cooperation between the provider and 
recipients. Government may not be able to satisfy residents’ complaints and dissatisfaction. 
When this occurs, residents can oppose to the government’s development plan/policy.  
This case is a case where the rewards, as a negative outcome of failed 
communication between the government and residents, come in order to compensate 
residents for locally unwanted land use development. The government needs to consider, if 
there is one specific type of reward leads to satisfaction, what type of reward would result a 
maximum level of residents’ satisfaction.  
 
H5b: The high intensity of actual complaints from government’s implementation of LULU 
will affect increased chance of getting rewards.  
 
4.4 Effects of Reward on Resident’ Decision Making 
4.4.1 Effects of Monetary Rewards to Residents towards the Locally Unwanted Land 
Use 
If government provides monetary rewards, reward can be very effective source to 
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residents who expected for such compensations, because it is an invaluable reward. That is, 
money, is a generalized (conditioned) reinforce (in psychological terms), exchangeable for 
other primary and secondary reinforcers (Catania 1998; Skinner 1953). Accordingly, residents 
are disregard a monetary rewards less than non-monetary reward because dissimilar 
particular rewards such as money retains infrastructure or structures, despite of changeable 
resident’s desire. If residents received a delayed monetary reward, it will fill up resident’s 
needs and expectation. 
In contrast, the utility of a specific, non-generalized reward may fluctuate (Catania 
1998; Skinner 1953). Its utility is variable according to reward. Individuals usually tried 
avoid risks, nonetheless, and thus are likely to consider such a commodity to be worth less 
than one (i.e., money) whose utility does not fluctuate, even when both have the same mean 
utility (Estle, Green, Myerson, Holt 2007). This gives advantage of monetary rewards over 
other types. 
Generally, when government development is being planned, monetary rewards are 
given to residents. However, this method does not always give them satisfaction. The 
government needs to consider the effectiveness of the usage of monetary rewards; and if so, 
amount needs to be considered to find out whether the amount of proportional to the level of 
satisfaction it would give to residents. There is also a possibility that residents might want 
different types of rewards.  
 
H6a: Monetary rewards from government’s implementation of LULU will affect to resident’s 
decision making on government development policy. 
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4.4.2 Effects of Non-Monetary Rewards to Residents towards the Locally Unwanted 
Land Use 
Kim, Shi, Srinivasan (2001) examined the reward type and its programs according to 
amount of government rewards or resident’s expectation toward to government rewards. By 
governments view point, non-monetary reward is the most inefficient reward, because 
residents’ expectation needs to meet with level of reward by government (Kim, Shi and 
Srinivasan 2001). Same applies to this study, that residents’ desired reward may be something 
that they find more value in that is not a monetary type. To compensate this desire, 
government can offer non-monetary rewards to effectively create the maximum level of 
satisfaction. 
According to study conducted by Kohls et al. (2009), based on their experimental 
observation, that monetary and social rewards had differential effects on response inhibition 
performance, need to be replicated. Blatter and Schultz (2006) found that person who 
expresses their discomfort feelings through verbal praise or certain actions has more powerful 
reward value compare to simple facial expression. Additionally, the results of Kunz and 
Linder’s study (2012), it suggests that affiliative rewards exhibit a positive moderating effect 
on the relationship between enjoyment-based motivation and the willingness to exert work 
effort(Kunz, Linder 2012). In contrast, monetary rewards seem to crowd out norm-based 
motivation, while leaving the impact of enjoyment-based motivation on the willingness to 
exert work effort unaffected (Kunz, Linder 2012). 
When government development is being planned, occasionally non-monetary 
rewards are given to residents. However, this method does not always give them satisfaction. 
The government needs to consider the effectiveness of the usage of non-monetary rewards; 
and if so, the type of non-monetary item needs to be considered to find out whether there is 
certain types that will increase the level of satisfaction it would give to residents. There is 
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also a possibility that residents might want different types of rewards.  
 
H6b: Non-monetary rewards from government’s implementation of LULU will affect to 
resident’s decision making on government development policy.  
 
4.4.3 Rewards that lead to Satisfactory & Confidence level to the Residents on the 
LULU development 
Ma and Roese’s research (2012) demonstrated that happiness is determined according to 
either relative or absolute depends on individual’s earning (Diener et al. 1993; Easterlin 1974; 
Hsee, Hastie, and Chen 2008; Kahneman et al. 2004; Stutzer 2004. Previous study measured 
the level of happiness by examine the correlation between residents who received more 
compensations and residents who received less compensations, and it explains the affection 
of reward (Ma, Roese 2012).   
This happiness does not restrict on the type of rewards as long as government and 
residents come to term to find the most feasible option by properly applying distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice. Upon successful in exchange of compensation with 
implementation of LULU, residents’ perception will shift into positive side of the project 
because highest level of satisfaction will give residents the maximum tolerance of LULU. 
Better yet, it will boost the public confident of government’s development plan of LULU in 
the area since the change of perception will result in their perceiving something positive for 
the society and for themselves.  
From various surveys and investigations to reflect residents’ needs and wants, 
government can make a sound decision to provide the best reward to residents. It is 
government’s role that finding residents’ absolute value in satisfaction can bring more 
effectiveness in implementing government development policy. This is not limited to either 
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monetary reward or non-monetary rewards, but rather, in this situation, whichever brings the 
most satisfaction would bring a better support from residents and community towards LULU 
as long as their suggestions are considered and acted upon. Highest level of satisfactory 
rewards, regardless of a type, is the one that can bring mutual understanding with residents by 
government’s analysis on residents’ behaviors and residents can fully support government’s 
locally unwanted land use development plan this way.  
This support will bring public confidence in order for the government to successful 
completion of LULU implantation while keeping residents’ satisfaction by providing a type 
of reward to achieve it. 
 
H7: The level of support to development will affect to public confidence toward Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development or plan. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Negative perception in distributive justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction. 
H2: Negative perception in procedural justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction. 
H3: Negative perception in interactional justice affects increased level of dissatisfaction.  
H4: Resident dissatisfaction will have negative effect on complaints’ intentions. 
H5a: The high intensity of willingness complaints will affect increased chance of getting 
rewards. 
H5b: The high intensity of actual complaints will affect increased chance of getting rewards. 
H6a: Monetary rewards will affect to resident’s decision making on government 
development policy. 
H6b: Non-monetary rewards will affect to resident’s decision making on government 
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development policy.  
H7: The level of support the development will affect to public confidence toward Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development or plan. 
 
V. Methodology 
5.1 Data Collection 
This study examines residents’ behavior based on dissatisfaction from the effect of 
perceived justices: distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Further, this study 
investigates how government’s development policy affected residents’ behavior based on 
their previous experiences of dealing with government with LULU implementation as well as 
their general perception towards government’s plan of placing LULU in their area. A survey 
was conducted to examine the following hypothesis from 16
th
 to 23rd of September, 2014. 
Languages written for this survey are English and Korean; the purpose of this is that survey 
was distributed to KDI students and Korean residents who live in the development area. The 
request for survey was sent out via e-mail with a timeline. In 7 days, total numbers of 
participants are two hundred thirty six, and there are three different types of response from 
the survey. From all participants one hundred seventy seven of respondents have never 
experienced living in a development area, twelve respondents submitted incomplete survey 
that had to be discarded, and two hundred twenty four submitted the survey properly.  
According to the analyzed data from surveys that distribute to participants who are 
aware of the term Locally Unwanted Land Use and may have experiences with the 
government that led to complain/complaining behavior to express their dissatisfaction toward 
the plan. Stratified sampling has applied on this study to hand out the survey grounded on the 
percentage of participants with the consideration of gender, age, education, income, and 
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occupations. Two hundred twenty four respondents have completed the survey in appropriate 
ways, and its response rate of 94.9% (i.e., Forty seven respondents with experiences of 
dealing with government on LULU implementation and one hundred seventy seven 
respondents with hypothetic scenario of the government’s LULU implementation in their area 
and how they feel about it). 
A multi-item scale has applied successively on each questionnaire to measure 
specific elements from participations. The questionnaire consists of multiple stages based on 
knowing what LULU is, personal experiences with LULU, opinions based on the perception 
of LULU, and the interaction with government regarding LULU implementation in the area. 
Furthermore, Likert scales and semantic differential scales have applied on this study, higher 
number of scale indicating higher level of dissatisfaction, and yes/no questions. Scales by 
previous studies (Cho, 2013; Oliver, 1980; Oliver, 1997; Swan & Trawick, 1981; Westbrook, 
1981) support to develop the items that serve the objectives of the present study.  
After the review, judges select about 54 items that represent the major constructs, 
such as three dimensions of justice, dissatisfaction, willingness to complain/actual 
complaining behavior, government reward, and public confidence with effects of advanced 
government services. Pilot study was conducted to modify survey items.  
In order to check construct reliability, this study measures Cronbach's alpha for 
multi-item scales for each of the constructs that serves as the basis for the questionnaire items.  
The applied Cronbach’s alpha provided the construct reliability for multi-item scales of each 
construct. This study found that Cronbach’s alpha for three justice dimensions in the case of 
locally unwanted land use development shows 0.87 (distributive justice), 0.82 (procedural 
justice), 0.87 (interactional justice), as well as 0.84 for (dissatisfaction). The study also found 
Cronbach’s alpha of above 0.81 for willingness to complain, 0.94 for actual complaining 
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behavior, 0.65 for intention of getting government reward, and 0.93 for public confidence. 
This study examined the effects of advanced services for the effects of dissatisfaction 
to willingness to complain/complaining behavior, willingness to complain/complaining 
behavior to repeat purchase behavior and getting government reward to public confidence. 
This study considers major effects of advanced services from the stage of dissatisfaction by 
considering overall dissatisfaction. 
5.2 Development of Research Questionnaires  
The structure of the questionnaire was based on research in part Ⅳ, where parts 
were made in order to investigate the residents’ process of perception towards LULU. In the 
beginning, general questions were asked: “do you currently live in government development 
area,” “what kind of experience do you have with government development,” and etc. These 
questions are intended to check the information of whether participants are currently living in 
government development areas.  
To evaluate the level of participants’ awareness and perception of the subject, the 
survey questions are designed to check in 7 Likert scales, higher number being more 
dissatisfied. First question is to find out how important participants think of the government’s 
LULU implementation in development area if it is being promoted in the area they live in. 
Not only determining their feelings towards the project, but we can also measure their 
expectation of compensating in exchange of government’s LULU development plan that can 
leave clues to estimate their level of satisfaction.  
Second question is to evaluate participants’ satisfaction by measuring subordinate 
elements that represent the factors to result in their satisfaction. It was measured, again, in 
Likert scale from 1 to 7, 1 being very satisfied while 7 being very dissatisfied. In these 
elements, some had a strong effect on participants’ satisfactions. Based on their responses, the 
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participants have to evaluate their satisfaction with Likert scale from 1 to 7 for specific 
elements on receiving rewards in compensation of government LULU development.  
Lastly, question was asked for participant’s overall satisfaction. In Likert scale, 1 
indicates strongly satisfied and 7 indicating strongly dissatisfied. Based on their satisfaction 
level, the following question was asked if the reward is worth in exchange of supporting 
government’s program in locally unwanted land use development in their area. This is also 
measured in Likert scale from 1 to 7 whether they are strongly satisfied with rewards they 
received. From this, we can determine the change of perception of government LULU 
development plan in correlation with their satisfaction level. 
5.3 Data Analysis Tool 
For the data analysis, the SPSS 11 program was used and the Excel program was also 
used to sort data. To test hypothesis, this research used the regression analysis and factor 
analysis. The factor analysis was used to identify the most influential factors to the customer 
satisfaction. And the defined the factors are tested by using regression analysis to ascertain 
the correlation with satisfaction. Above all, the reliability tests previously carried out as well. 
 
VI. Data Analysis 
6.1 Respondents Demographics 
48.7% female and 51.3% male made up the two hundred and twenty four 
respondents. 51.2% were observed to be between the ages of 20-29 years old; 44.1% were 
deemed to be between the ages of 30-39 years old and 2.6% and 2.0% were in there 40s; and 
50s respectfully. Of the population of respondents, 0.5% reported that their highest education 
level was a high school completion level, 4.1% possessed an associate’s degree, and 69.9% 
and 25.5% had an undergraduate degree and a graduate degree respectfully. Annual incomes 
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reported by 34.6% of respondents stated that it was less than $20,000, 40.4% between 
$20,000 and $40,000, 19.1% were between $40,000 and $60,000, and 5.9% were more than 
$60,000. Those who identify as self-employed is about 3.1%, 7.2% were professionals, 2.6% 
were public officers, 4.1% were educators, 3.1% were housewives, 30.4% were students, 
43.3% were office workers, and 6.2% were others. 
6.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Through applied factor analysis, to validate the constructs for justice dimensions, it is 
certain that the study validates the factors of justice dimensions, dissatisfaction, willingness 
to complain, complaining behavior, government rewards and public confidence. Furthermore, 
the most relevant data emerged through the use of principal components analyses as the 
extraction method and varimax rotation methods with Kaiser Normalization (Cho 2013). 
The factor analysis results indicate that items represent the influential variables for 
locally unwanted land use development and give significant declined factors with Eigen 
values over 1.00. Table VI-1 below shows factor analysis results for the justice dimension 
with the case of residents’ dissatisfaction toward Locally Unwanted Land Use development. 
Items Components 
Factors Scale Items 1 2 3 
DISTRIBUTIVE 14 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE 15 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE 16 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE 17 
 
DISTRIBUTIVE 18 
 
PROCEDURAL 21 
 
PROCEDURAL 22 
 
PROCEDURAL 23 
 
PROCEDURAL 25 
 
PROCEDURAL 26 
I think that information about developing Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) provided 
by government is not reasonable.  
I think that it is not fair to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since 
many local residents do not prefer to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) in town. 
I think that opinions were fairly treated by government representative or administration 
regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use development (LULU) issue. 
I think the government is not distributing information and services to residents equally 
on Locally unwanted Land Use issue. 
Overall, distributed services for my complaints offered by government representative do 
not meet my expectation for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
I am often disappointed with delivery time with the government during the procedure of 
Locally Unwanted Land Use development. 
I don’t think that my opinion of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) plan is often well 
proceeded. 
I think that procedure to government plan of the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development should be improved. 
Overall, I think that procedure offered by the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development does not meet my expectation. 
I think that the overall procedure to receive feedback on my opinions from government 
.923 
   
.867 
   
.799 
 
.780 
 
.681 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.867 
 
.780 
 
.758 
 
.746 
 
.690 
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INTERACTIONAL 28 
 
INTERACTIONAL 29 
 
INTERACTIONAL 30 
 
INTERACTIONAL 31 
 
 
INTERACTIONAL 32 
representative was unfair. 
It would be ideal if I could contact with government representative or administration 
anytime if I need to ask them about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
I don’t think that I could receive response about my questions on Locally Unwanted 
Land Use (LULU) as soon as possible. 
Overall, I think that interaction with government representative or administration does 
not meet my expectation on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
Follow-up services on opinions were not fair due to infrequent interaction from 
government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development. 
I think that information and explanation about my opinions were not enough by public 
officer or government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development. 
 
.913 
 
.894 
 
.877 
 
.788 
 
.611 
 
 
Table VI-1. Component Matrix: the Case of Justice Dimension with Resident Dissatisfaction 
  
 Additionally, regression analyses have applied in this study as well as ANOVA (the 
analysis of variance). Table VI-2 below shows the regression analysis results which apply 
scores for the effects of types of justice to the dissatisfaction. The results of the ANOVA in 
the case of impacts based on residents, dissatisfaction find the models significant at the .01 
level with F = 28.582 (r-square = .131), F = 63.034(r-square = .250) and F = 101.648 (r-
square = .347). According to the results of regression analyses verified that effects of justice 
dimension on dissatisfaction are all accepted (H1, H2 and H3). 
Variable (Independent -> dependent) 
Standardized Coefficient (t-value-Sig) 
Locally Unwanted Land Use Development 
Distributive Justice-> Dissatisfaction (H1) 0.362 (5.346***) 
Procedural Justice -> Dissatisfaction (H2) 0.500 (7.939***) 
Interactional Justice -> Dissatisfaction (H3) 0.589 (10.082***) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table VI-2. Summary of the Effects of Justice Dimension to Dissatisfaction for Locally Unwanted Land Use 
Development 
 
Applied to this study for measuring the impacts of residents’ dissatisfaction on the 
willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior was regression analysis for Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development. As shown in table VI-3, this study demonstrates that 
effects of dissatisfaction on resident’s complaint intention (H4), dissatisfaction on the 
willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior are significant (H5a, b) for Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development. The results of the analysis for the effects of dissatisfaction 
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to the willingness to complain find the models significant at the 0.01 level with F = 81.280 
(r-square = .302) in the case of locally unwanted land use development. The results of the 
analysis for the effects of dissatisfaction to the actual complaining behavior prove that the 
models are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level with F = 15.791 (r-square = .076) in the case 
of locally unwanted land use development. 
Variables (Independent -> dependent) 
Standardized Coefficient (t-value-Sig) 
Locally Unwanted Land Use Development 
Dissatisfaction -> Complaints (H 4) 0.514 (8.247 ***) 
Dissatisfaction -> Willingness to Complain (H 5a) 0.549 (9.016 ***) 
Dissatisfaction -> Complaining Behavior (H 5b) 0.276 (3.974 ***) 
Resident Complaints -> Monetary Reward (H 6a) 0.239 (2.942 ***) 
Resident Complaints -> Non-Monetary Reward (H 6b) 0.185 (2.564 ***) 
Government Reward -> Public Confidence (H 7) 0.592 (8.788 ***) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed);** Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table VI-3. Summary of the Effects of Variables for Locally Unwanted Land Use Development 
This study also applied regression analyses for the impacts of the complaining 
behavior to getting government monetary and non-monetary rewards for locally unwanted 
land use development (H6a~b). Overall, the results of the analysis for the effects of 
complaining behavior to getting monetary rewards found that the models are significant at the 
0.01 level with F = 8.653 (r-square = .057) in the case of locally unwanted land use 
development. Overall, the results of the analysis for the effects of complaining behavior to 
getting non-monetary rewards found that the models are significant at the 0.01 level with F = 
6.575 (r-square = .034) in the case of locally unwanted land use development. Therefore, the 
study accepted H6a~b. The table VI-3 also demonstrates the effects of government rewards to 
public confidence. The results of regression analysis for the effects of government rewards to 
public confidence indicate that the models are significant at the 0.01 level with F = 53.839 (r-
square = .224) in the case of non-monetary rewards and F = 77.223 (r-square = .351) in the 
case of monetary rewards. Therefore, the study accepted H7. 
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VII. Conclusion 
7.1 Discussion 
 The main purpose of this study is to explore resident perception towards locally 
unwanted land use development by determining justice dimension, dissatisfaction, 
willingness to complain, actual complaining behavior, intention of getting government 
reward, and public confidence. This study finds strategic relationship between residents and 
government’s locally unwanted land use development with residents’ dissatisfaction, 
willingness to complain, complaining behavior, intention of getting government reward, and 
public confidence of the subject. The result of the study finds that government’s assisting 
with residents’ need, by providing a satisfactory service in compensation of the lulu 
installment can enhance the relationship with residents as well as their opinions of locally 
unwanted land use development in their area. This study applied impact of monetary reward 
(Deci 1971), and non-monetary rewards such as park, art gallery, library, etc., to measure 
proposed relationships on locally unwanted land use. Additionally, this study uses 
urbanization as a base, and based on that concept, it examines the effects of that aspect 
focusing on implantation of locally unwanted land use development. The crucial relationships 
found in this study are: residents’ dissatisfaction from justice dimensions of locally unwanted 
land use and willingness to complain and actual complaining behavior based on the level of 
their dissatisfaction, and the possibility of receiving rewards based on their willingness to 
complain and actual complaining behavior, and the effect to increase public confidence from 
receiving monetary and/or non-monetary rewards. Residents’ dissatisfaction of locally 
unwanted land use illustrates significant results as an effect of their willingness to complain 
and complaining behavior toward the government of the project. Residents’ willingness to 
complain and complaining behavior can be found as a result of their dissatisfaction as 
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previous studies has also found based on the private sector. Previous studies (e.g., Oliver 
1997; Cho 2011; Day 1984) found the reluctance of dissatisfied residents in expressing their 
concerns and complain. Due to the lack of residents’ filing complaints, they were not able to 
receive satisfactory action from the government that was expected from the residents 
(Messick et al. 1983). Further, this study finds that the effect of dissatisfaction to wiliness to 
complain and complaining behavior to locally unwanted land use is high. As a result of 
studying residents’ dissatisfaction on wiliness to complain and willingness to complain 
behavior, they expressed a high level of expectation in receiving rewards. This behavior is 
due to their dissatisfaction of locally unwanted land use in their area, and this can be resolved 
once the reward meets their level of expectation. This result acts as an essential source of the 
fact that government reward contributes to the level of effects of dissatisfaction to the 
willingness to complain and complaining behavior. In addition, this study finds that the 
intention is the condition to residents’ willingness to complain and complaining behavior. 
This study also finds that both monetary and non-monetary rewards are highly expected by 
the resident in compensation of locally unwanted land use development in their area. 
Therefore, the conflict can be resolved by providing either monetary or non-monetary 
rewards to meet residents' expectation, and the result of this study shows the effects of 
willingness to complain and complaining behavior on intention of getting a government 
rewards. 
This study has academic implications. The result, firstly, investigated links with 
residents’ dissatisfaction in the LULU development by applying justice dimension with 
concept of equity. Secondly, this study also explored the relationship based on residents’ 
dissatisfaction. Third, this study analyze the correlation of residents’ dissatisfaction and their 
expectation of whether monetary or non-monetary reward would be better suited for their 
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needs in order to settle with government’s locally unwanted land use development. From this 
study, justice dimensions are found to have a high influence on residents’ dissatisfaction to 
locally unwanted land use, and how it acts as motivation to their willingness to complain and 
actual complaining behavior. By applying the theoretical insights, as Cho (2013) stated that 
relationships between complaining behavior and public confidence on the government locally 
unwanted land use developments are fundamental for the strategic issues Relationship 
Management for residents in urban development area or LULU development area. In addition, 
this study suggests to Resident Relationship Management by proposing the importance of 
solutions to resident’s dissatisfaction, which become a means of gaining residents’ confidence 
in government LULU development (Cho 2013). Two types of categories were applied in 
order to classify residents’ dissatisfaction: monetary and non-monetary. This study finds that 
residents have a preference slightly higher towards monetary reward over non-monetary 
rewards. When the expectation does not meet, their dissatisfaction will amplify (Fournier and 
Mick 1999) From this study, when implementing essential facility such as locally unwanted 
land use, receiving rewards is mandatory that government should focus on. As mentioned, to 
meet the expectation of having locally unwanted land use in their backyard, the expectation 
from residents is high regardless of the type of the reward. In particular, results of the study 
display how monetary reward and non-monetary reward is the important key to successfully 
manage relationships between resident’s dissatisfaction and government urban development 
or LULU development plan (Cho 2013). In this case, government should consider providing 
sustainable local supporting program with the implantation of locally unwanted land use if, 
for example, residents prefer facility such as park, art gallery, museum, library, recreational 
center, as their need in the area. 
This study has implications that investigated relationships on residents’ 
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dissatisfaction towards the urban and LULU development by applying justice dimension with 
concept of equity. Moreover, this study addresses improved government compensations such 
as monetary or non-monetary reward, to explored correlation between resident’s 
dissatisfaction and public confidence on the urban and LULU development.  
A multivariate statistics was applied to this study, moreover cause and effect relationship in 
LULU development might need to be considered in future studies.  
7.2 Limitation of Study  
Despite of results obtained from this study, there are limitations imposed to this study. 
Firstly, the survey was conducted mainly in Korea with only Koreans because focus of this 
study is on locally unwanted land use (LULU) development in Korea. However, this study 
can also be applicable to cases in foreign countries in the future. Secondly (Firstly), size of 
sample was insufficient to standardize the residents’ behavior in locally unwanted land use 
development area. Moreover, it was very difficult to find surveyors who have experience 
living in such development area or expertise knowledge. Lastly, it was not clearly classified 
to measure the difference between the effect of monetary and non-monetary rewards from 
government. Furthermore, resident’s preference level on government rewards was not clearly 
found. Because there is difficulty finding people, who lived in urban developing area or lulu 
development area, to conduct survey for a better and detailed result. In order to find more 
detailed result of this study, the survey should be conducted in various regions including 
foreign countries in the future. This study applied only quantitative research results from 
surveys to examine resident’ perception toward government locally unwanted land use 
(LULU) development. Nonetheless, qualitative research should consider conducting with 
residents in development area in the future. Finally, this study can be used as an application to 
consider urban development or LULU development related public policy issues in future 
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studies. 
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Appendix 
Justice, Dissatisfaction and Reward in Government Locally Unwanted Land Use Development 
Please take 20 minute to answer the following questions. Your responses to this survey are strictly 
confidential and will not be revealed to anyone other than researchers. Participation in this survey 
must be voluntary. All data will also be kept anonymously. The intent of this work is academic 
research purposes only. No individual or organization will be identified in any analyses or reports 
connected to the survey data. Samples will be selected from the age group of 20-65. The researchers 
welcome any questions or comments concerning this survey or the research project. Your contribution 
is very important to provide better development policy & plan in Locally Unwanted Land Use 
(LULU) development and decrease local resident’s dissatisfaction and complaints. If you have any 
inquires on this survey. Please don’t hesitate to contact 010-5414-3633 or klee44@nate.com. Thank 
you! 
Location Application Original Function 
   
Irwon-dong Maru Park, Korea Sports Park Wastewater Treatment Facility 
   
Seoul Memorial Park, Korea Parks, Gallery, Cafeterias Crematorium Facility 
   
Osaka Disposal Plant, Japan Experience Space, Park Garbage Incineration Plant 
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Niagara Park, Canada Natural Park Hydroelectric power plant 
Figure 1. Case Image of Locally Unwanted Land Use with Supplementary Facility (spaces). 
In Urban development or land-use planning, a locally unwanted land use (LULU) is a land use that is 
useful to society, but objectionable to its neighbors. LULUs can include power plants, waste 
incineratior, waste water treatement facility, crematorium and many other developments. Planning 
seeks to distribute and reduce the harm of LULUs by zoning, environmental laws, community 
participation, buffer areas, clustering, dispersing and other such devices. Thus planning tries to protect 
property and environmental values by finding sites and operating procedures that minimize the 
LULU’s effects. LULUs always provide services a community needs, but few people want to live 
near them because of their externalities, real or perceived. Moreover, that community nees can 
reflected by government rewards to decreasing resident’s dissatisfaction. Thus, it gives motivation to 
residents to participate in Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your experience with Locally Uwanted Land 
Use Development. 
 
1. Have you ever lived in urban development area?  (      ) Yes   (      ) No  
2. Do you know if Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) exists in your area? 
  (      ) Yes   (      ) No 
3. Have you ever researched about Locally Unwanted Land (LULU) Use when or before it came to 
your town? 
(      ) Yes   (      ) No 
4. How would feel if you found out the government is planning on Locally Unwanted Land Use 
(LULU) in your town? 
Very Satisfied        1      2      3      4     5     6      7    Strongly Dissatisfied 
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5. How much do you think that the government reward for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
will give a satisfaction? 
Very Unlikely        1      2      3      4     5     6      7    Highly Likely  
6. Overall, how much were you dissatisfied with government Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
Development projects? 
Slightly Dissatisfied  1      2      3      4     5     6      7  Strongly Dissatisfied  
 
Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences with Locally Unwanted Land Use plan 
or development. 
(Distributive Justice) 
a. I think that the condition of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development is in general not 
acceptable.       
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
b. I think that information about developing Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) provided by 
government is not reasonable.   
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
c. I think that it is not fair to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since many 
local residents do not prefer to have Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) in town.    
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
d. I think that opinions were fairly treated by government representative or administration regarding to 
Locally Unwated Land Use development (LULU) issue.    
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
e. I think the government is not distrbuting information and services to residents equally on Locally 
unwanted Land Use issue.     
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
f. Overall, distributed services for my complaints offered by government representative does not meet 
my expectation for Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
(Procedural Justice) 
a. I often hesitate to agree to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development plan due to the 
procedure.     
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Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
b. I am often disappointed with delivery time with the government during the procedure of Locally 
Unwanted Land Use development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
c. I don’t think that my opinion of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) plan is often well proceeded.    
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
d. I think that procedure to government plan of the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU)  
development should be improved.       
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
e. I concern about providing my personal information regarding Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
plan.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
f. Overall, I think that procedure offered by the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU)  development 
doese not meet my expectation. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
g. I think that the overall procedure to receive feedback on my opinions from government 
representative was unfair.    
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
(Interactional Justice) 
a. It would be ideal if I could contact with government representative or administration anytime if I 
need to ask them about Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
b. I don’t think that I could receive response about my questions on Locally Unwanted Land Use 
(LULU) as soon as possible.   
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
c. Overall, I think that interaction with government representative or administration does not meet my 
expectation on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
d. Follow-up services on opinions were not fair due to infrequent interaction from government 
representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.    
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
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e. I think that information and explaination about my opinions were not enough by public officer or 
government representative regarding to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.   
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
f. How do I receive prompt answer/response from government representative to opinions significantly 
affect to my decision making to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
 
(Dissatisfaction) Please rate (v) your overall opinions/expectations about Locally Unwanted 
Land Use (LULU) development. 
Strongly  Disagree                         Strongly Agree 
a. I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as the plans do not 
meet my expectation.       
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
b. I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as time schedule of 
the development was not what I expect.   
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
c. I am not satisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development as I could not enjoy 
where I live after it was completed.   
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
d. Overall, I am dissatisfied with the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
 
(Willingness to complain) Please rate (v) your overall opinion about experiences from Locally 
Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
 (You may choose N/A if it is not applicable).  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
a. I was about to express my unpleasent feelings to government representative or administation about 
Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development, but I actually didn’t do so. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
b. I regret that I didn’t actually complain even though I wasn’t satsfied with Locally Unwanted Land 
Use (LULU) development. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
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c. I often do not actually complain when I feel that the perceived losses (e.g., property value) that 
might not be so well treated by Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
d. I reluctant to complain to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development since I don’t want to 
waste my time and cost. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
e. I hesitate to complain to Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development I don’t want to 
encounter uncomfortable situations. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7   Strongly Agree 
 
(Complaining Behavior) Please rate (v) your overall opinion about experiences regarding your 
complaints to government representative of Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
If you'd never actually complained to government representative or administration. (your may 
choose N/A if it is not applicable). 
 
a. I actually complained to government representative or administraion that I am not satisfied with the 
Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development. 
Strongly  Diagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Strongly Agree    N/A   
b. I expressed my unplesant feeling to government representative that Locally Unwanted Land Use 
(LULU) development with believe that it make up more reward or compensation. 
Strongly  Diagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Strongly Agree    N/A   
c. I don’t regret with my complaints as those service failures should be treated well. 
Strongly  Diagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Strongly Agree    N/A   
d. I will complain to all stakeholders and government representative till I get a satisfactory responses 
on Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) development 
Strongly  Diagree     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Strongly Agree    N/A   
(Resolution) Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences regarding your complaints 
and reaction from government representative or public officers.  
(Reward – Monetary & Non-monetary)  
(Non-monetary Reward)  
a. Government non-monetary reward (Park, Culture Center, Public libarary, Nursing Home etc.) can 
resolve Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) conflict between government and residents.  
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Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
(Monetary Reward)  
b. Government monetary reward can resolve Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) conflict between 
government and residents.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
(Reward) 
c. I think that it is easy to get non-monetary reward when the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development comes to my town. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
d. I think that it is easy to get monetary reward when the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development comes to my town. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
e. I think that additional non-monetary rewards are needed for the Locally Unwanted Land Use 
(LULU) development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
f. I think that additional monetary rewards are needed for the Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) 
development.  
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
(Public Confidence) Please rate (v) your overall opinions about experiences regarding locally 
unwanted land use development.  
a. Resident’s confidence level has increased by government rewards. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
b. I think that well resolved complaints caused by government reward will help improve public 
confidence. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
c. Overall, government reward will help increase trust in the feild of lcoally unwated land use 
develpment. 
Strongly  Diagree  1     2      3      4     5     6      7      Strongly Agree 
 
Demographic Information (Please select the closest answer for each question.) 
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1. Gender (      ) Female    (      ) Male 
2. Marriage  Married (    ) Single (   ) 
3. How old are you? (      ) 18-20 (      ) 21-25 (      ) 26-30 (      ) 31-35  
                 (      ) 36-40 (      ) 41-45 (      ) 46-50 (      ) 51+ 
 
4. Your Education 
(      ) High Shcool or Below 
(      ) Associate degree (finished 2 years of college) 
(      ) Bachelor degree (finished 4 years of college) 
(      ) Master degree or higher 
5. Occupation 
(      ) Student                   (      ) Own a personal business 
(      ) Businessman               (      ) House wife 
(      ) Public Officer              (      ) Military 
(      ) Educator                  (      ) Others 
7. Your annual income?  
(      ) Not Available               (      ) $10,000 or less 
(      ) $10,001 - $20,000            (      ) $20,001 - $30,000 
(      ) $30,001 - $40,000            (      ) $40,001 - $50,000 
(      ) $50,001 - $60,000            (      ) $60,001 - $70,000 
(      ) $70,001 – more 
 
 
 
 
Thank you ! 
 
 
 
